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Introduction 
 
International Political Economy (IPE) studies the dynamics between politics and economics 
on a global scale (Heywood 2004:216; Cohn 2000; Underhill 2000:3; Frieden and Lake 
2000:1). This area of study – originally a subfield of International Relations – is relatively 
new in modern science, established in the late 1960s and 1970s (Cohn 2000:9; Frieden and 
Lake 2000:1). Various events and factors of that time, such as the oil crisis of 1973, which 
could not be solely attributed to market based economic considerations, contributed to a new 
interest in IPE (Frieden and Lake 2000:2). Furthermore, this period witnessed a fundamental 
change in the global economic order, from an international economic framework coined by 
Keynesianism1 to an economic framework coined by a Neo-liberalalism2. For many scholars, 
such as Keohan and Nye (1977:83) and Gowa (1983:15), the end of the ‘dollar-gold exchange 
regime’ – one pillar of the Bretton Woods system – on 15 August 1971 marked the end of the 
post war economic order which was dominated by Keynesianism. While monetary authorities 
of many states in that era preferred stable exchange rates which enabled a rapid expansion of 
trade (Pauly 2000:120), after 1971 major economies, such as the US and Japan,  shifted to 
floating exchange rates. But what explains this preference? 
 
Governments were increasingly faced with capital transactions exceeding their official reserve 
holdings and thereby making currency peg adjustments more difficult (Eichengreen 2008:2). 
Higher capital mobility, combined with a growing scale of capital transactions, forced some 
of the major industrial powers, in particular the US and Japan, to float their exchange rates 
(Eichengreen 2008:1,134,135). In contrast, Goodman and Pauly (2000:281) argue that 
governments removed their capital controls not because of increased capital mobility but 
because of “…changes in the structures of international production and financial 
intermediation…” Nevertheless, all would agree that with the break down of this system in 
1971 it became possible for countries with excess of money, in particular states of the Middle 
East in the 1970s, and Japan in the 1980s, to recycle surplus money3 through the international 
 
1 In this context, the term Keynesianism refers to a particular set of policies “recommended by Keynes […] in 
particular of government intervention in the economy in order to stimulate demand” (Scruton 2007:368). 
 
2 The term Neo-liberalism “refers to a set of market-liberal economic policies” (McLean and McMillan 
1996:368). 
3 In the case of the Middle East: money derived from high oil prices.In the case of Japan: money derived from 
export activities. 
financial system into international investments (flowing into the US and other states) 
(Krugman/Obstfeld 2000:8). In this context international finance has occupied its central 
position in economics and become one of the core fields in the study of IPE. 
 
The financial arena can be characterised as a place where investors, banks or other institutions 
intermediate between savers and borrowers (Oatley 2008:238; Bryant 1987). Bryant 
(2003:23) refers to financial intermediation as the “...entire complex process through which 
the myriad independent decisions of individual […] savers and individual […] investors are 
reconciled.” Through this intermediation, surplus resources – that is, resources which are not 
consumed – can be transferred from savers to borrowers (Oatley 2008:238; Solomon 1982:4; 
Bryant 2003:3). Similarly on a larger scale, “[i]nternational financial transactions transfer 
resources from high-saving to low-saving countries” (Eichengreen 2004:281).  
 
However, this intermediation between savers and borrowers on an international scale was 
challenged in the period before 1971. This period (1945-1971), heavily influenced by 
Keynesianism, was characterised by capital controls and pegged currencies, which made the 
exchange of money among individuals of different countries difficult (Oatley 2008:238).  
Consequently, this period characterised by low international financial transactions was 
different from the era after 1971. After 1971 the financial sector has grown more rapidly than 
the real economy in terms of volume. According to Helleiner (2005:152), “International flows 
of money [in 2005] dwarf the cross-border trade of goods.”4 In other words, financial links 
have been growing faster than trade links. This indicates a rapid increase in economic 
interdependence, in particular finance, among countries (Bryant 2003:7).  
 
Although nations continue to be politically independent, they are “…economically and 
financially interdependent” (Solomon 1982:6). Whereas the political world is still organized 
around nation states, the economic world does not necessarily mirror these political borders 
(Talbott 2003:xi; Bryant 1987; Bryant 2003). Countries are increasingly economically linked 
together through growing international capital flows (Krugman and Obstfeld 2000:8; Pauly 
2000:119; Bryant 1987:3; Bryant 2003:4).  
                                                 
4 “Daily turnover on foreign exchange markets more than doubled from [US]$590 billion in 1989 to 
[US]$1.210 billion in 2001 compared to daily world exports of approximately [US]$25 billion” (McGrew 
2005:212).  
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The deepening of international financial linkages has resulted in economic interdependence 
among nations. Consequently, international factors increasingly influence domestic policies of 
states (Pauly 2000:119). Open capital markets which allowing money to flow across borders 
make it increasingly difficult for governments to pursue exclusive national priorities, such as 
financing welfare (Pauly 2000:123). This shift towards open capital markets was supported by 
neo-classical economics that emphasises the market’s central role in the allocation of capital 
among actors.  
 
Neo-classical ideas, which underline the superior role of private actors in the allocation 
process of resources, have become state of the art in economics since the 1970s. Hence, their 
proponents, most notably Friedman and Hayek, disqualify governmental involvement in 
economics. This normative disqualification of state participation in economics, combined 
with technological advances and international economic integration established in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, created an atmosphere where numerous commentators, such as Ohmae 
(1995) and Reich (1991) predicted the end of nation state leading to a borderless world. 
 
However, states continue to be the central actor in international politics (Thompson and Hirst 
1996: 2). Similarly, governments sustain their involvement in some areas of economics. One 
of the most dynamic areas – at least for the last ten years until 2007 – in international finance 
has not been under private surveillance, but under governmental control. States controlled at 
the end of 2007 more than US $3 trillion via so called sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
(Maslakovic 2008:1). SWFs can be defined in the widest sense as separate pools of 
government owned or government controlled international assets which are, in most cases, 
funded either by commodity revenues – most notably oil – or exchange surpluses (Truman 
2008:1,2). Hence, the future size of SWFs is predicted by the amount of available external 
surplus. According to Jen (2007:1), Aizenman and Glick (2008:1), and Lyons (2007:1) these 
government related pools of capital will continue in the next five to ten years so as to reach a 
volume of US $12-14.4 trillion. A more careful estimation made by Fernandez 
(2008:9,10,11), which integrates a decline in oil prices over a longer period and diminishing 
foreign exchange surpluses of Asian economies, predicts further growth of SWFs to 
approximately US $5 trillion by 2012. In particular, oil exporting countries which will be 
confronted with the question of “what to do with the $4.7 trillion- $8.8 trillion5 […] by 2020” 
are keen to diversify their overall investment portfolio through SWFs on an international level 
                                                 
5 based on an oil price of $50-$100 a barrel 
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(Rodenbeck 2008:68). Barber (2008:147), who emphasizes that the “…big winners in 
financial services in 2009 will be those best able to mobilise capital and spot undervalued 
assets,” indicates in the same breath that SWFs might be such a potential winner. These 
findings suggest that although SWFs were also hit by the financial crisis at the end of 2008 
because of large international investments, they will continue to play a major financial role 
due to their huge asset volume.  
 
The volume of SWFs combined with other factors, in particular some of their investments, is 
widely discussed from a number of perspectives, but most specifically in terms of their 
objectives and implications. Numerous commentators from a variety of backgrounds ranging 
from economists to politicians,  and organisations such as the IMF or a variety of think tanks 
(e.g. Brookings Institute, Peterson Institute, and more), influence the SWF debate. 
Consequently, this heterogeneity of observers involved in the debate mirrors, to some extent, 
the diversity in opinions over many topics related to SWFs. For instance, there is no 
consensus as to whether the investments of SWFs are motivated by political agendas. While 
there are those such as Summers (2008: [1]) who indicate that investments made by SWF 
might also be driven by political rather than economic concerns6, others, most notably 
Sulayem (Khalaf 2008: [1]), take the position that SWFs are solely driven by economic and 
not political motives7.  
 
Such disagreements even extend to the question of their impact on the international financial 
system. SWFs have become so large, particularly by the end of 2007, that they have 
implications for financial stability. On the one hand, one faction led by the IMF (2008a: 
12,13) takes the position that SWF have a stabilizing effect on the international financial 
system since they are long term investors: “In the recent financial turmoil, SWFs have 
demonstrated that they can have a stabilizing influence on markets” by injecting capital into 
the market, in particular banks (IMF 2008:10). SWFs were responsible for 71 per cent “of 
total bank capital raised since Nov. 2007” (Srinivasan 2008:24) (see Appendix A). According 
to Aizenman and Glick (2008:22) “[b]etween November 2007 and January 2008, SWFs from 
emerging markets injected more than [US]$44 billion of capital into needy financial 
                                                 
6 “For example, perhaps a state- owned fund wants an airline to fly to its country. Perhaps it wants a bank 
to do extensive business in its country (Summers 2008:[1]).” 
 
7 “These investment funds are not run by governments. I invest because there is a return and I will sell 
and I do not need to take permission from the government whether I’m buying or I’m selling (Sulayem 
cited by Khalaf 2008: [1]). “ 
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institutions in advance economies…”. Hence, there is evidence that SWFs have had a 
stabilizing effect in the past. Nevertheless, on the other hand, some observers, such as 
Gardner and Wroughton (2008: [1)] emphasize that “S[s]ome countries where the sovereign 
funds invest, like the United States, are worried that the funds […]could be a destabilizing 
factor in international markets.” Many SWFs lack transparency concerning their objectives 
and investment strategies. This has led some authors, such as Summers and Johnson (2007: 
[1]), to alert that SWFs could “encourage capital account protectionism” since some countries 
want to protect politically sensitive areas of their economies. Public announcements from high 
government officials, such as German Chancellor Merkel to “protect European companies 
from unwanted foreign takeover” (Merkel cited by Raphaeli and Gersten 2008: [2]), confirm 
those fears. Similarly, the US “is in the process of adopting legislation that would tighten 
scrutiny of investments by foreign governments that raise security concerns” (Mattoo and 
Subramanian 2009 :21). 
 
The current size of all SWFs – approximately US $3 trillion – is large if compared, for 
example, to the US GDP of approximately US $12 trillion (Johnson 2007: [1]). But, by 
comparing the volume of SWFs assets with the volume of global traded securities – worth 
approximately US $165 trillion in 2007 – the picture changes (Johnson 2007). Hence, much 
of the literature (Kimmit 2008:[1]; Johnson 2007; IMF 2008a:6) takes the position that though 
SWFs are significant players, their asset size represents only a fraction of the total 
international financial assets. Furthermore, there is an overall consensus that the portfolios of 
SWFs differ from traditional reserve holdings in that sense that SWF assets are more 
diversified  (see Chapter 3) than traditional reserve holdings (IMF 2008a: 4,9). By 
diversifying their assets into more complex investments – such as private equity or hedge 
funds – SWFs take advantage of international finance. These findings illustrate vast 
discordance among commentators about many central issues related to SWFs.  
 
A variety of disciplines, in particular economics and economic geography8, influence and 
investigate the discourse about the phenomenon of ‘SWFs’. However, there has been no work 
about that topic in the field of IPE. It must be remembered that politics and economics cannot 
be clearly separated, especially in the case of SWFs, since there is no broad consensus as to 
whether their investments are motivated by economics or politics. Thus, an IPE perspective, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 The Department of Geography at the University of Oxford pursues extensive research – under Professor Clark 
– about SWFs. 
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embracing both economic and political variables on a broader scale, enables a more 
comprehensive analysis of SWFs in a political context. An analysis which embraces politics 
and economics is more adequate to describe such a complex phenomenon. Furthermore, such 
a description must also attempt to build a theoretical framework which explains connections 
among central elements related to SWFs. According to Strange (1988:11), theory must 
explain some aspects which are not explainable by ‘common sense’.  For instance, to those 
who assume that SWFs are purely economically driven, some of the investments of SWFs 
seem paradoxical: Why do some of the SWFs invest in lower yielding domestic assets when 
they could have had a higher rate of return by investing internationally? Thus, assumptions 
combined with common sense cannot explain important aspects of SWFs. Some institutions, 
most notably the IMF, have introduced categorisation schemes (see Appendix B) which reveal 
important facets of SWFs. Nevertheless, such categorisations are often built on assumptions 
and ‘common sense’, rather scientific evidence. Therefore, this thesis closes this gap by 
establishing a coherent scientific categorisation built on evidence, rather than presumptions, in 
order to explain some dynamics of SWFs.  
 
The phenomenon of SWFs is consistent with more than one interpretation. Thus an empirical 
survey, which integrates historical dynamics and applies known theories to new terrain seems 
a plausible solution in order to understand competing ideas about SWFs. To research SWFs, 
an analysis of official documents, and second by an analysis of the political economic context 
of the historical trajectory of SWFs support this empirical work. However, given that nearly 
all of the SWFs are located in states with a non-democratic character, precise information or 
data of SWFs is hard to locate, or to deduce from the governments’ propaganda released in 
periodicals.  
 
It should be emphasized that economic level analyses alone do not possess sufficient leverage 
to reveal the forces that contribute to the emergence and behaviour of SWFs. An adequate 
understanding of SWFs and their dynamics requires the incorporation of both economic 
variables and political context. Although having critizised a purely economic approach in 
order to understand SWFs, it should be stressed that economic analysis is a substantial 
element in this work. However, it is maintained that pure economic analysis by itself is not 
satisfactory to explain the complex phenomenon SWFs. This thesis serves as a complement, 
rather than as an alternative, to the current SWF debate which is dominated by economics. It 
investigates the dynamics which influence SWFs in a political world. By doing that, it is 
   6
 
automatically acknowledged that other variables, such as politics, significantly influence 
SWFs.  
 
After the introduction, Chapter 1 positions the current debate in a historical context. It begins 
by investigating the enormous public attention SWFs have received between 2007-2008. 
Then, it steps back to analyse whether SWFs are a recent phenomenon by addressing the 
political context under which the first SWFs emerged. This historical discussion emphasises 
that the economics of the first SWFs were heavily influenced by politics. Political factors 
created the economic basis for the first SWFs which can be traced to the Middle East.  
 
Given the background in the earlier chapter, Chapter 2 shifts from historical insights 
associated with the Middle East to the current situation. SWFs, originally a regional 
phenomenon, have become a global issue. In contrast to the past, the present picture of SWFs 
is more complex in terms of their funding, objectives and investments. Chapter 2 analyses this 
diversity among SWFs by introducing a framework which captures the geographical, 
economic, and governmental diversity associated with SWF into a coherent historical 
categorisation. 
 
Having discussed the observable differences among SWFs, Chapter 3 analyses the differences 
between SWFs and other financial institutions. Chapter 3 introduces a coherent categorisation 
of SWFs and other government-related investment vehicles, such as central banks and public 
pension funds. Although, there are intersections between SWFs and other financial actors, 
Chapter 3 explains how and why these actors should be clearly separated. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 begins the process of adapting the fundamental ideas of Chapter 2, which 
emphasises the heterogeneity of SWFs. It indicates similarities among central elements 
related to different types of SWFs. Furthermore, Chapter 3 indicates a strong correlation 
between the variable ‘investment allocation’ – whether foreign of domestic investments – and 
the variable ‘investment patterns’ – whether portfolio or direct investments.  
 
This thesis establishes a coherent categorisation and operational definition of SWFs by 
integrating economic and political variables into an empirical IPE framework. It is 
demonstrated that politics, in other words state involvement, shapes the economic basis of 
many SWFs. Although the patterns of state involvement differ from country to country, they 
can be distinguished: systems where states are involved in economics through direct 
   7
 
participation (e.g. as entrepreneurs), and systems where states are involved in economics 
through indirect participation (e.g. regulation). This differentiation between direct and indirect 
involvement mirrors SWFs which either participate passively (through portfolio investment) 
or actively (through direct investment) in the economy. Consequently, there are a number of 
important implications for the future practice, in particular for both sectors: private as well as 
the public sectors, in dealing with SWFs. 
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 1. Historical Trajectory of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
 
The issue of Sovereign Wealth Funds has received increasing attention since December 2007. 
SWFs have been one of the dominating issues in the financial press since 2007 and other 
media. In contrast to other financial investors, the involvement of SWFs in other non- 
financial related areas may be more visible. Hence, a wide range of commentators are 
involved in the discourse, ranging from economists and financial experts to politicians, since 
SWFs are related to governments through the ownership or management structures. But this 
current debate has also attracted public interest through provocative media coverage 
proclaiming the “Invasion of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (The Economist 2008 [1]) to some 
extent reminiscent of the Japanese investment debate9 in the 1980s. Through, the sudden 
emergence of SWFs in the media world it seems that this player emerged from nowhere. 
 
Although there is currently wide research about several aspects of SWFs, most research 
exclusively focuses on the actual processes of SWFs, neglecting the interesting history of this 
phenomenon. Little is known about the historical circumstances under which SWFs emerged. 
But an understanding of past reveals important insights into the current phenomenon of 
SWFs. An adequate account of historical aspects reveals that SWFs can hardly be explained 
solely on an economic basis. Most of the economic issues related to SWFs are heavily 
intermingled in a political context. Therefore, this chapter proposes an overview of some 
historical International Political Economic circumstances which were pre-conditional for the 
emergence of the first SWFs. By looking back at history in order to analyse the political 
context in which the first SWFs emerged, further analysis about current tendencies is possible. 
While the first section of this chapter concentrates on the question of whether SWFs are a new 
phenomenon, the subsequent section locates this question in a comprehensive historical 
overview about the political economic context in which the first SWF appeared.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Farrell (1997) provides a comprehensive overview about the Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Real Estate in the period 1985-1994. 
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1.1.  A New Phenomenon? 
 
The phenomenon of SWFs has received considerable attention from media, politicians and 
business since the end of 2007. The topic of SWFs has been one of the dominating issues in 
regard to financial newspapers, such as The Financial Times (Figure 1). In 2007 The 
Financial Times published 595 articles about SWFs, whereas the number of articles in 2008 
concerned with that topic amounted to 1150. In contrast, SWFs were hardly covered in the 
years before 2007. Hence the question of whether the political prominence of 2007 and 2008 
mirrors the economic prominence is a serious one (see Figure 1 and Graphic 12). 
 
Figure 1. Number of Articles related to SWFs in The Financial Times 
Year Number of articles  
2003 4 
2004 17 
2005 7 
2006 7 
2007 595 
2008 until June 1150 
 Source: The Financial Times Online 2008 
 
Figure 1, for instance, indicates that SWFs were doing business before 2007 without much 
public attention. Rozanov (2005:1) explains the rise in public interest due the massive growth 
in SWFs and their asset volume over the last decade. The major implication is that SWFs now 
have to operate in the limelight of public attention, where the media follows carefully every 
step of sovereign investment. Of course, the coverage of the last 20 months comprises only 
one part of the much older phenomenon of SWFs.  Therefore, in order to have a better 
understanding of this phenomenon, it is useful to try to put the current events into a historical 
context. History reveals something about the economic and political circumstances under 
which the first SWFs emerged. 
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 1.1.1. The first Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
History reveals that the first traces of SWFs can already be found in the early 1950s. This 
period was characterized by emancipating developing states which demanded more power 
over domestic economic matters. The preconditions for the first SWF evolved in that context. 
The 1950s marked a clear transformation in the power relationship between private 
international oil companies and governments in favour of the latter (Penrose 1968:248-264). 
In this era, for instance, especially in oil producing countries, more government pressure 
towards higher oil taxes on multinational petrol enterprises emerged (see Tétreault 1995; 
Tugwell 1975; Petras et al. 1977). The higher income from an increase in oil taxation 
automatically resulted in a dramatic increase in state revenue, which was in some countries 
the basis for the creation of SWFs. 
 
At that time three states – Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait – had a significant influence 
in the development of that type of investment vehicle. In the first instance, Venezuela played 
a central role in making the first step in the late 1940s by leading in the design of new means 
of appropriating surplus from oil profits and placing limitations on corporate business 
(Tugwell 1975:3). Under the administration of a military junta after 1945, the tax rate per 
barrel was raised by the government up to 50 per cent (Petras et al. 1977:13). As a 
consequence, Venezuelan oil income rose from 98 million Bolivares in 1940, to 901 million 
Bolivares in 1950 which meant a 920 per cent oil revenue increase (Tugwell 1975:167). At 
the same time production rose only 299 per cent from 502.3 thousand Barrels in 1940 to 
1.498.0 thousand Barrels in 1950 (Tugwell 1975:183). However, most of the oil revenue was 
subsequently invested, not in a fund but into a growing state sector that boosted import 
substitution industrialisation. Although Venezuela did not as a consequence create a SWF, it 
did indeed play a role by impressing the Saudi Arabians who went one step further.  
 
In the second instance, Saudi Arabia followed in Venezuela’s footsteps in creating the pre-
conditions which were essential for the first SWF. Although the early Saudi Arabian example 
does not comply fully with the IMF category of SWF, it is important for a comprehensive 
appreciation of that topic to understand the historical circumstances under which this SWF 
precursor evolved. While there are those, such as Truman (2008:2), Blundell, Jermo, Yu-Wei 
(2008) or agencies like Reuters (2008), who list the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
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(SAMA) in ratings among other SWFs, others, most notably Goldman Sachs (2007:239), 
exclude the SAMA from their SWF ratings.  Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia was the first Middle 
Eastern country in the early 1950s that raised the corporate oil tax in the same 50:50 fashion 
as Venezuela had done before. This action nearly doubled the Saudi governmental revenue 
from US $56,7million in 1950 to US $110 million in 1951 (Young 1983:21). Confronted with 
this huge increase in governmental revenue, King Abd al-Aziz, supported by his Finance 
Minister Shaykh Abd Allah Sulayman, officially asked the US government for financial 
advice in December 1950 (Young 1983:27).  In the wake of this enquiry, the US sent a 
mission comprised of financial experts under the direction of Arthur N. Young to Saudi 
Arabia. Young’s team created the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which had the 
same generic tasks as a Western national bank, such as providing monetary stability, financial 
and economic research, but also had fiscal functions such as centralizing the government 
revenues (Mallakh 1982:294-297). Young specifically emphasized in his 1952 Report on 
Establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency   the assignment of the SAMA to 
handle the enormous oil revenues in the countries interest: 
 
In particular foreign exchange has become a major problem. At least four-fifths of 
the revenue now is in foreign currency, mainly from oil. Wise handling of foreign 
exchange transactions as well as wise use of the funds is vital to the country’s 
stability and progress (Young 1983: 135). 
 
However, it is extremely difficult to find empirical data about the diverse investments, 
because SAMA operates under Islamic law that forbids any interest payments. If SAMA is 
accepted as the first SWF, then this contradicts Paul Kimmitt (2008) who claims that Kuwait 
was the first country with a SWF. Nonetheless evidence suggests, while Venezuela and Saudi 
Arabia were substantial precursors for the creation of a SWF, the Kuwaiti Fund was the first 
genuine SWF. 
 
The Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian examples prompted Kuwait to impose an oil tax. The 
Kuwait government established the Kuwait Investment Office in 1953 with the official 
purpose of “investing the surplus oil revenue in order to provide a fund for the future and 
reduce its reliance on its single finite resource” (KIA 2008 [1]). Accordingly, the Kuwait 
Investment Office was a product of the high oil revenues in the 1950s. According to Al-Atiqi 
(2005:3), a member of the Kuwait Petrolium Council, the state oil revenue increased tenfold 
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from 0.4 million Kuwaiti Dinars in 1947 to 4.0 million Kuwaiti Dinars in beginning 1950s. 
This increase in oil revenues can be explained by the implementation of oil taxes on the one 
hand, and a substantial increase in the output rate, on the other hand. While the 
implementation of oil taxes can be ascribed to the domestic government, the dramatic increase 
in the output rate was the result of a crisis in Iran. The Kuwaiti oil supply was stimulated from 
125.7 million barrels to 273.4 million barrels (Baker 1986:142) because of the political crisis 
in Iran, where Prime Minister Mossadeq nationalised the oil industry. The nationalist 
Mossadeq insisted that the agreements with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petrol) 
were not in the national interest of Iran (Sampson 1993). As a consequence of this 
nationalisation, BP mobilized its government to implement an embargo against Iranian oil and 
increased its exploitation activities in neighbouring Kuwait (Sampson 1993: 158-163). This 
circumstance helped Kuwait to become the largest single Middle Eastern oil producer 
between 1953 and 1966 (Merip 1975:5). 
 
The high oil revenue of that time was the basis of a Kuwaiti welfare state and the foundation 
of power of the ruling family (Tetreault 1995:3). According to Tetreault (1995:3), in order to 
sustain the welfare state that provides the citizens of Kuwait with one of the highest living 
standards in the world, the Shaikh agreed to establish the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) in 
London. Basically, the idea was that a part of the oil income should be put in the KIO in order 
to ensure enough revenues to maintain the welfare state at times when oil price is low 
(Monroe 1954:281). Thus, the geographic aspect of having huge amounts of oil combined 
with a state that was determined to benefit from the oil wealth through active involvement, led 
automatically to high oil revenues which were subsequently invested in the 1953 SWF. 
 
In conclusion, the first SWF created by Kuwait was heavily influenced by the actions of other 
countries, in particular Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. These actions of implementing high 
unilateral oil tax on multinational companies in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, combined with 
the threat of expropriation or, in other words nationalisation, of international private operating 
oil firms, illustrate the increasing demands of politics over economics. This chapter has shown 
that the environment in which the first SWF evolved has seen a strengthening of certain states 
less willing to compromise with private business. In fact the decision to implement a 50:50 oil 
tax which laid the basis for establishing the Kuwait Investment Office can be characterised as 
highly political. Thus the Kuwait Investment Agency, the first true SWF, was the product of 
heavy political influence in a period where countries increasingly referred to their sovereign 
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rights of consuming and distributing national wealth among their citizens. However, this 
historical example should not encourage the assumption that SWFs are automatically the 
outcome of more state influence, since most of the SWFs which have emerged in the post 
1970s are characterised by less state influence. 
 
This chapter has explained some of the political economic factors involved in the 
establishment of the first SWFs. Whereas the first traces of Sovereign Wealth can be located 
in oil producing countries of the Middle East, the situation has been changing over time 
contributing to a more complex picture. The following chapter shows that SWFs can hardly 
be described as a phenomenon confined to oil rich countries of the Middle East transferring 
abundant petro dollars into such investment vehicles.  
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 2. Sovereign Wealth Funds among other Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the origins of SWFs can be traced to a particular 
geographical region. Western Asia, better known as the Middle East, possesses some of the 
oldest SWFs, including the first: the Kuwait Investment Office established in 1953. But since 
the early 1970s the situation has altered to a more complex one, since a couple of Western 
countries such as the US, Norway, and some Asian countries, in particular Singapore and 
China, have been establishing SWFs. In fact, at the end of 2007 the picture had changed 
dramatically. As Graphic 1 shows, SWFs are spread internationally: at the beginning of the 
21st century these investment vehicles are represented on every continent. 
 
 
Graphic 1. Sovereign Wealth  among Regions in Billion US $ 
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Sources: Volume of SWFs calculated on the basis of Fernandez (2008:21); division of regions on the basis of 
United Nation’s (2000) classification. 
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The diversity of countries mirrors to some extent the diversity of funds. The term SWF is 
often used as an umbrella term to describe a quite heterogeneous group of actors. According 
to Truman (2008) this term describes a diverse group of separate capital pools, including 
international assets, related directly or indirectly to the governments to achieve a mixture of 
economic, financial and political objectives. Therefore, some kind of categorisation has to be 
established to group these different actors along similar lines. However, there are different 
ways to bring order in this diversity, such as comparing their size or their objectives10, to 
categorize or typify SWFs. The most common way to discriminate SWFs from each other 
refers to their different sources of funding. General distinctions can be made between SWFs 
financed by commodity revenue, such as oil, and SWFs financed by non-commodity revenue, 
in particular exchange surpluses (IMF 2007:45; Fernandez 2008:4,5; Beck and Fidora 
2008:6,7; Jen 2007:1; O’Neill 2007:237; Aizenman and Glick 2008).  
 
This analysis integrates this distinction between commodity revenue based and export surplus 
based funds into a framework that distinguishes between OECD and non-OECD countries. 
However, this chosen dichotomy of OECD versus non-OECD countries requires some further 
explanation. This dichotomy not only refers to a distinction between states which are ‘in and 
out’ of a certain international organisation. Rather, it also covers additional analytical 
dimensions – geographical, economic and governmental – which are important for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the SWF phenomenon. This heuristic categorisation of 
OECD versus non-OECD states investigates whether global dynamics have different impacts 
on SWFs of various states. In other words, are there similar dynamics involved among all 
SWFs regardless of location? Nevertheless, by adopting OECD non-OECD categorisations, 
some conceptual problems remain. 
 
While OECD countries can be described as a homogeneous group which share a lot of 
similarities, non-OECD countries can be specified as a quite heterogeneous cluster. Therefore 
in order to narrow the latter category, only non-OECD countries with SWFs are considered. 
Immediately upon doing that, a large number of non-OECD countries which have no SWFs, 
such as India, South Africa, and Brazil, are eliminated. Consequently, the remaining states of 
this category with a SWF are grouped under the label non-OECD. However, the label non-
OECD continues to comprise a quite heterogeneous group of countries. But for the purpose of 
this analysis a simplification is necessary, because only such a dichotomy allows the 
                                                 
10 The IMF (2007) and Fernandez (2008) differentiate SWFs according to various objectives. 
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comparison of the three dynamical dimensions – geographical, economic, and governmental – 
associated with the emergence of SWFs. These crucial dynamics are described by Setser 
(2008:2) who emphasizes that “capital has flowed […] from poor countries to rich countries, 
from fast growing countries to slow growing countries, […] and increasingly, from 
autocracies to democracies.” Similarly, Eichengreen (2008:190) describes the situation where 
“savings in poor countries were financing consumption in one of the richest [the US].” 
Graphic 2 illustrates the flow of capital described by Setser (2008). The following sections 
show that the dynamics on these levels – of geography, economy, and government – match 
the dichotomisation of OECD versus non-OECD in a coherent way. 
 
However, this particular pattern of capital flow – from non-OECD to OECD countries – refers 
only to capital associated with surplus capital (e.g. such as current account surplus). 
According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005:8) “a number of emerging markets – particularly 
Asian countries, together with Russia – have been on average net capital exporters…” In the 
long term perspective, capital flows in the form of FDI from industrial countries to emerging 
markets continue to outnumber the capital flows from emerging markets to industrial 
countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008:8,9). 
 
Graphic 2. Surplus Capital Flows (until 2008) 
Dimension non-OECD  OECD countries 
Geographic 
Economic 
Government 
non western                                  western 
emerging                                      industrialised 
autocracies                                   democracies 
 
Section 2.1. focuses on the geographical dimension, by initially giving an overview of SWFs 
among macro regions. Subsequently it will be shown that the dichotomy of OECD- non-
OECD states fits in that picture, that is, this dichotomy of OECD versus non-OECD can be 
justified in a geographical sense. Section 2.2. examines the economic dimension, which 
reflects to some extent, the highly industrialised countries associated with the OECD, and the 
emerging markets associated with the category non-OECD countries. Finally, Section 2.3. 
concentrates on the governmental dimension between OECD and non-OECD countries. While 
all OECD countries have a strong commitment to democracy and liberal market capitalism 
(OECD 2008 [1]), most of the non-OECD states have in common that they are non-
democratic (Figure 2).  
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 However, in the first instance the categorisation of OECD versus non-OECD countries covers 
a geographical dimension, since the largest assets of sovereign wealth are concentrated in 
countries in Western Asia and South Eastern Asia which are non-OECD countries members, 
excepting South Korea.  
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2.1. Geographical Aspects 
 
SWFs of particular regions – most notably Western Asia, often associated with the Middle 
East, and South and East Asia – have experienced dynamic growth in the last ten years.  That 
growth has resulted in an increasing imbalance of SWF assets among regions in general, and 
states in particular. For instance, sovereign wealth assets associated with the states of Western 
Europe, and North America together account only for approximately less than one quarter of 
the total worldwide SWF volume11. Graphic 1 illustrates that SWFs are internationally spread. 
At the same time it clearly shows the uneven asset allocation of these funds. Western Asia and 
other parts of Asia are the dominant players in sovereign wealth investment, whereas the 
highly industrialised regions of North America and Western Europe play a relative small role. 
Graphic 1 only depicts the uneven distribution of SWF assets among regions, but within those 
regions the roles of countries vary to a great extent as well.  
 
Chapter 1 has already shown that some of the oldest and largest SWFs are concentrated in 
countries of Western Asia, in particular Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Countries of 
this region share one main characteristic, namely massive oil wealth which is partly 
transferred into their SWFs. Graphic 3 shows that the two dominant states in the sovereign 
wealth sector in this region are the neighbouring oil producing countries: the UAE, and 
Kuwait. Together both Gulf nations share more than 90 per cent of the SWF assets of this 
region12. Although oil prices are highly volatile, commentators, in particular Rodenbeck 
(2008:68), estimate that these countries will be confronted with an inflow of oil money 
between US $4.7 trillion and US $8.8 trillion at the end of the next decade. Similarly 
Fernandez (2008:10) calculated that SWFs of oil exporting countries would continue to grow, 
even in the context of low oil prices of between US $50-70 per barrel. That raises the question 
for these countries of whether to spend that money at home or abroad. According to 
Rodenbeck (2008:68), despite monumental domestic investment projects – such as the UAE 
Palm Island –  there is plenty of money left to be invested into SWFs in order to diversify the 
international portfolio of these countries. Hence, to date Western Asia can be described as the 
biggest geographical pool of sovereign wealth in the world. This region will remain a 
substantial financial player in the SWF sector in the next decade. 
 
                                                 
11 Calculated on basis of data from Fernandez 2008:21. 
12 Calculated on data from Fernandez 2008:21. 
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Graphic 3. Sovereign Wealth in Western Asia in Billion US $ 
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Sources: Highest estimates from Fernandez (2008:21); The Economist (2008d). 
 
Western Asia is followed by the region of South and Eastern Asia, where most of the 
sovereign wealth assets are concentrated in two states: the city state Singapore and 
China/Hong Kong (see Graphic 4). These countries have in common that they finance their 
SWFs with surplus capital generated from export activities. Eastern Asia, for instance, has 
experienced a rapid growth of sovereign wealth, especially with the foundation of the first 
Chinese SWF in 2007. In that year China established one of the largest SWFs by transferring 
US $200 billion from its exchange reserve overhang into the Chinese Investment Corporation 
(CIC 2008: [1]). However, by the end of 2008 the situation looks different. The financial 
crisis combined with an economic downturn in some of the main export markets of China – 
most notably the US and Europe – has impacted China’s exchange reserve surplus. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that this might result in a general disappearance of SWFs 
in Asia. Rather, the recent events on the international financial markets have different 
consequences for certain countries. Whereas China’s exports to the US amount only to 8 per 
cent of the Chinese GDP, Singapore is, with 30 per cent, more dependent on the US market 
(Woodall 2008:55). But at the same time Woodall (2008:55) admits that China’s growth in 
GDP in 2009 – of approximately seven per cent – is substantially lower than in 2007. These 
findings suggest that capital inflows into SWFs might decrease in times of lower export 
activities, but that does not mean that SWFs will dissolve. Fernandez (2008:10) would also 
agree that even a substantial drop in the current account surpluses in some Asian countries 
would not automatically lead to a disappearance of SWFs in this region. 
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Graphic 4. Sovereign Wealth in South & Eastern Asia in Billion US $ 
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Sources: Highest estimates from Fernandez (2008:21), Truman (2008). 
 
 
Europe (Western and Eastern Europe) comprises two remarkable players – Norway’s Pension 
Fund Global and the Russian Stabilisation Fund – in the field of sovereign wealth investment. 
The Norwegian fund – located in an OECD country associated with the ‘West’ – is the second 
largest global SWF with a volume of more than US $250 billion (see Graphic 5). The 
Norwegian government finances its fund through oil and gas revenues. In contrast, other 
Western European countries, such as Ireland and France, fund their SWF mainly through 
fiscal transfers, comprising capital generated through privatisation, as in the case of France 
(Fernandez 2008:43; Truman 2008:2). In a similar fashion, Graphics 6, 7, and 8, show the 
disequilibrium in SWF assets among countries within the regions of Oceania, Africa and 
North America. 
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Graphic 5. Sovereign Wealth in Western Europe in Billion US $ 
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Source: Fernandez (2008:21). 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 6. Sovereign Wealth in Oceania in Billion US $ 
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Source: Fernandez (2008:21). 
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Graphic 7. Sovereign Wealth in Africa in Billion US $ 
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Source: Highest estimates from Fernandez (2008:21). 
 
 
Graphic 8. Sovereign Wealth in North America in Billion US $ 
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Source: Fernandez (2008:21). 
 
 
The previous sections have illustrated a geographical imbalance among regions and, within 
those regions, between countries. Data confirms that there is a high concentration of sovereign 
wealth in a small number of non-Western countries13. Some of the funds of these states 
possess further growth potential partly due to high commodity prices or foreign exchange 
reserves accumulated through heavy export activity. For example, the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange which manages China’s foreign reserves possesses assets of more than US 
$1800 billion (SAFE 2008 [1]), much more than it would need for its balance of payments 
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purposes (El-Erian 2008:195). This overhang of reserve money could be easily invested in a 
SWF. Setser (2008:209), Aizenman and Glick (2008:3), and Eichengreen (2008:16) would 
agree that China was holding at the end of 2007 more reserves than it would actually needed 
for liquidity purposes. Liquidity in that context refers to the “ability to meet temporary 
deficits in its balance of payments without resort to fundamental corrective measures” (Arndt 
1947:37). However, some countries associated with the West – most notably Japan14 – may 
be potential big players in the field of sovereign wealth investment in the future (The 
Economist 2008c: [1]). That means the geographical allocation of SWF assets among western 
states associated with the OECD and non-OECD countries can change over time.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
According to Fieldhouse (1999:1), OECD states are, in contrast to non-OECD states, often 
associated with the vague geographical notion of ‘the West’. In the case of OECD countries 
with SWFs, the geographical split of ‘the West’ versus ‘Rest’ could be justified – at least until 
2007 – since Western Europe, Oceania and North America comprise more than 95 per cent15 
of the sovereign wealth assets of OECD members. The remaining five per cent of SWF assets 
associated with OECD countries are located in South Korea and Mexico. Thus, only a small 
part of SWF assets associated with OECD countries is located in non-Western states. 
Comparison of Graphic 9 with Graphic 10 illustrates that by rearranging the states associated 
with the OECD into a single category, there is little change in the overall picture. As a result 
this differentiation mirrors, to some extent, a geographical dichotomy of countries associated 
with the West and a variety of other countries.  
 
However, a geographical distinction between the ‘West and the Rest’ is highly problematical 
because of the dilemma of how to determine what makes the West and the Rest. This 
distinction, originally used by novelists, most notably Kipling in his ‘The White Man’s 
Burden’ (1899), to describe the superior position of Europe over other countries, highlights 
that the conception of ‘West’ scarcely refers to a mere geographical description.  But this 
dichotomisation is justifiable if an economic dimension is added. Scholars, such as Adelman 
(1998:13,14), frequently use the term OECD as a synonym for highly industrialised rich 
countries.  
 
 
13Except Norway which has the second largest SWF. 
14 According to The Economist (2008c [1]) Japan considers the transfer of pension fund assets into a SWF. 
15 Calculated on data from Fernandez 2008:21. 
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Graphic 9. Sovereign Wealth  among Regions in Billion US $ 
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Sources: Volume of SWFs calculated on the basis of Fernandez (2008:21); division of regions on the basis of 
United Nation’s (2000) classification. 
 
 
Graphic 10. Sovereign Wealth assets among OECD and non-OECD states in Billion US $ 
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Sources: Volume of SWFs calculated on the basis of Fernandez (2008:21); division of regions on the basis of 
United Nation’s (2000) classification; OECD (2008b). 
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 2.2. Economic Aspects 
 
The previous section has shown that a distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries 
on pure geography is problematic. Therefore, these geographical flaws are complemented by 
adding an economic dimension. Here again OECD countries constitute a quite homogeneous 
bloc of highly industrialised countries, whereas non-OECD countries constitute a more 
heterogeneous bloc; on the one hand, comprising emerging markets – the so called ‘BRICs’ 
consisting of [Brazil], Russia, [India], and China (O’Neill 2001 [1]) – on the other hand, 
comprising OPEC members – such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Nigeria – 
but also other developing countries, most notably Angola or Kiribati. But, if wealth among 
countries is measured by the comparison of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – describing the 
value of goods and services produced within a country in a certain period – the three richest 
countries in terms of GDP continue to be OECD members: the US, Japan and Germany (IMF 
2008 [1]). Consequently, these findings would suggest that such a dichotomisation on the 
economic dimension between OECD countries and non-OECD countries can be justified. 
 
However, there are also highly industrialised non-OECD countries, such as Singapore with a 
GDP per head exceeding that of Switzerland, the Netherlands or Sweden (CIA Factbook 
2008). Although there is as strong correlation between wealthy countries and the OECD, 
wealth creation also happens independently from an affiliation with the OECD. But still, the 
most developed states are affiliated with the OECD, an organisation with a strong 
commitment to market economy and democracy (OECD 2008:10). That leads directly to the 
third point: government. In contrast to most of the non-OECD states, OECD members consist 
exclusively of democracies (OECD 2008:10).  
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2.3. Governmental Aspects 
 
While both OECD and non-OECD countries play the same economic game ‘capitalism’, they 
play this economic game under a different set of political rules. All OECD countries with 
SWFs are democracies, whereas nearly all non-OECD states with SWFs are controlled by 
autocratic governments (see Figure 2). According to Freedomhouse (2008; see Figure 2), 100 
per cent of the OECD countries with SWFs can be characterised as free, whereas only 12 per 
cent of non-OECD countries with SWFs are described as free16. But does the form of 
government – whether democracy or autocracy – have implications for SWFs?  Evidence 
shows that there is at least a strong correlation between the form of government and the 
characteristics of SWFs affiliated with these states. In order to evaluate the characteristics and 
practices of SWFs, Truman (2008:8,9) constructed a SWF scoreboard which is divided along 
different categories17 which measure transparency, accountability, and the behaviour of 
SWFs. Glick and Aizenmann (2008: 16) underline the relationship between democracy and 
the SWF scores on the Truman chart. 
 
The data of Figures 2 and 3 support, to a limited extent, the assumptions and figures of Glick 
and Aizenmann (2008:12), and Aizenman and Glick (2008:10), that countries with SWFs tend 
to have less democracy. On the one hand, Figure 2 outlines that most of the SWFs are located 
in non-OECD countries. Nearly all SWFs associated with non-OECD countries are ruled by 
non-democratic governments. But on the other hand, a substantial part of sovereign wealth 
can be located to OECD countries which are in all cases democratically ruled states (see 
Figure 2). Keech (1995: 10) suggests that the form of government – whether democratic or 
autocratic – has economic implications. While goals in a democracy are “…defined and 
redefined within the democratic political process”, in autocratically ruled states, these goals 
are often set “outside of it…” (Keech 1995:10). Similarly, Aizenman and Glick (2008:12) 
                                                 
16 The status – Free, Partly Free, and Non Free – is determined by a combination of political and civil liberty 
rights (Freedomhouse 2008). 
 
17 The scoreboard embraces four categories: 
I. ‘Structure’: “An SWF’s high score on the elements in this category provides confidence to the 
citizens of the home country and of countries where the fund may invest that the activities of the 
fund are transparent” (Truman 2008:8). 
II. ‘Governance’: “The governance category covers the respective roles of the government and fund 
managers in conducting the operations of an SWF…” (Truman 2008:9). 
III. ‘Accountability and Transparency’. 
IV. ‘Behavior’: “It combines aspects of risk management with features that may be of concern to 
market participants because of the potentially large scale of SWF investment activities” (Truman 
2008:12). 
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emphasise that “[i]n more democratic countries, political contestability implies that the SWF 
agenda and investment goals should be more aligned with the domestic electorate, implying 
greater demand for domestic transparency.” Figure 3 illustrates that SWFs of OECD countries 
have an average higher score on the Truman chart than SWFs of non-OECD countries. Hence 
OECD SWFs tend to be more transparent, and thus more accountable, than their non-OECD 
counterparts. Although this thesis cannot determine a causational relationship between the 
form of governance and aspects related to transparency, there is at least a strong correlation 
between these variables.  
 
The first three sections of this chapter have shown that the heuristic categorisation of OECD 
and non-OECD states comprises all three dimensions: geography, economy, and government. 
Setser (2008) associates the emergence of SWFs with these three dimensions. Therefore, an 
analysis of SWFs should include these dimensions in order to get a more comprehensive 
picture. It has been demonstrated throughout Chapter 2 that the dichotomy of OECD versus 
non-OECD states mirrors these dimensions in a coherent way. Consequently, the following 
section of this chapter builds on these findings by questioning: are there similar dynamics 
among all SWFs (influenced by macro-economic dynamics) regardless of to which state they 
belong to, and how can global dynamics explain commodity and non-commodity funds 
separately? Therefore, the OECD- non-OECD dichotomy is combined with another 
dichotomy of ‘commodity’ versus ‘non-commodity’ financed SWFs in an historical matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
   28
 
Figure 2. Status OECD and non-OECD countries 
OECD Non-OECD 
Country Status Country Status 
Australia F Algeria NF 
Canada F Angola NF 
France F Azerbaijan NF 
Ireland F Botswana F 
Mexico  F Brunei NF 
New Zealand F Chile F 
Norway F China NF 
South Korea F Colombia PF 
United States F East Timor PF 
Gabon PF 
Iran NF 
Iraq NF 
Kazakhstan NF 
Kiribati F 
Kuwait PF 
Lybia NF 
Malaysia PF 
Mauretania PF 
Nigeria PF 
Oman NF 
Qatar NF 
Russia NF 
Saudi Arabia NF 
Singapore PF 
United Arab Emirates NF 
 
Venezuela PF 
Notes: F=Free, PF= Partly-Free, NF= Non-Free. 
Source: Freedomhouse 2008. 
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Figure 3. SWFs scores between OECD and non-OECD countries 
OECD Non OECD 
Country Fund Truman 
overall 
score 
Country fund Truman  overall 
score 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund 95 
US Alaska Permanent 
Fund 
94 
Norway Government Pension 
Fund Global 
92 
France Fonds de reserve pour 
les retrait 
92 
US Permanent Mineral 
Trust 
91 
Ireland National Pension 
Reserve Fund 
86 
 
Australia Future Fund 80 East Timor Petroleum Fund 80 
Canada Alberta Heritage Fund 74 Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund 77 
South Korea Korea Investment 
Corporation 
51 Chile Stabilisation 
Fund 
70 
Mexico Oil Stabilisation Fund 47 Hong Kong Exchange Fund 67 
Kazakhstan National Fund for 
the Republic 
Kazakhstan 
64 
Botswana Pula Fund 55 
Russia Reserve and 
National Welfare 
Fund 
51 
Kuwait Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority 
48 
Singapore Temasek 45 
Singapore Government 
Investment 
Corporation 
41 
Malaysia Khazanah 38 
China China Investment 
Corporation 
29 
Kiribati Revenue 
Equalisation 
Reserve Fund 
29 
Algeria Revenue 
Regulation Fund 
27 
Nigeria Excess Crude 
Account 
26 
Iran Oil Stabilisation 
Fund 
23 
Venezuela Stabilisation 
Fund 
23 
Oman State General 
Reserve Fund 
20 
Brunei Brunei 
Investment 
Authority 
18 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Mubadala 15 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Istithmar World 14 
Qatar Qatar Investment 
Authority 
9 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority 
9 
Source: Truman (2008:7). 
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2.4. Sources of Sovereign Wealth 
 
The previous section emphasized that the categorisation of OECD and non-OECD countries 
implies three elements: geographical, economic, and government. Furthermore, it has been 
indicated that the establishment and funding of SWFs depend on the availability of resources. 
These resources are either generated by revenues from commodity exports, such as oil, gas, 
copper or diamonds, or foreign exchange reserves and fiscal surplus.   
 
The commodity funded SWFs account for the largest stake in sovereign wealth world wide. In 
particular, oil exporting states of the Middle East (Western Asia), such as the United Arab 
Emirates or Kuwait are the dominant players. According to Truman (2008:4) 72 per cent of 
all SWF derive their money from commodity revenues, in most cases from oil export.  
Consequently, this heavily reliance on oil revenues suggests a relationship between the 
formation of SWFs and international oil prices. Periods of high oil price have enabled some 
countries, especially those of the Middle East, to accumulate large portions of petrol dollars. 
Governments – such as Kuwait or United Arab Emirates – channel a fraction of this oil 
money into a SWF. Hence, global commodity prices affect the availability of resources which 
are transferable into a SWF. Although, these commodity financed SWFs (in particular oil) 
presumably continue to dominate the SWF landscape, experts such as Truman (2008a:169-
183) and Setser (2008:201-218) point out that some of the ‘non-commodity SWFs’ – in 
particular the China Investment Corporation – have experienced dynamic growth. In fact, 
non-commodity financed SWFs have the potential to become, under certain circumstances, 
major players. 
 
In contrast to commodity financed SWFs, the largest non-commodity financed SWFs are 
located in oil importing regions, in particular South and Eastern Asia. As the term ‘non-
commodity’ already indicates, their way of funding differs from countries which fund their 
investment vehicles with money generated from natural resources, such as oil, gas or copper. 
For instance, China, Hong Kong and Singapore finance their SWFs with exchange reserves or 
fiscal surpluses generated by export activities or fiscal policies (Fernandez 2008:2). In the 
first case, the size of foreign exchange reserves, which can be transferred into a SWF, affects 
the availability of resources. These findings suggest that in both cases (commodity financed 
and non-commodity financed SWFs) the availability of wealth – either through natural 
resources, trade or fiscal policies – constitutes the foundation for establishing a SWF.  
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 Having differentiated between commodity and non-commodity SWFs the following part 
applies these findings into a historical matrix in order to analyse some of the dynamics which 
influence SWFs. According to Garson (1971:12) “history must be divided into categories that 
simplify history for the purposes presumably useful to analysis.” In the case of commodity 
financed SWFs the historical matrix is divided into four periods. This chosen chronology 
mirrors on the one hand the dynamics of international oil price, whereas, on the other hand it 
reflects the emergence of SWFs in the context of these dynamics. The main question is 
whether these dynamics affect SWFs of OECD and non-OECD states in a similar way? 
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 2.4.1. Commodity financed Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Chapter 1. showed that some of the oldest and largest SWFs are concentrated in countries of 
the Middle East. But also outside the Middle East, most countries18 share one main 
characteristic, namely oil wealth which is partly transferred into a SWF. Therefore, the main 
criteria for the historical dividing lines in Figure 4 revolve around global oil prices. The 
matrix of Figure 4 is divided into four periods. Each of these periods illustrates a wave of 
SWF formation which corresponds with the dynamics in international oil prices (see Figure 5 
and Appendix A). The argument of this section is that commodity based SWFs – in particular 
oil financed SWFs – are more likely to be established in periods of high oil price19. However, 
exact data concerning their current volume is not available. In fact, neither official data nor 
estimations concerning their original (foundation) volume are existent. Thus all the 
estimations about the volume of SWFs in this section refer to evaluations made in 2008. 
 
The foundation phase (1953-1973), characterised in Chapter 1 as the period of the first steps 
of SWFs, can be described as an era of cheap oil. Nevertheless, Kuwait exported enough oil to 
accumulate sufficient surplus money to establish the Kuwait Investment Office, a SWF 
located in London. This SWF, with an estimated volume of US $250 billion, belongs in 2008 
to the top five global SWFs (see Figure 4).  
 
This period was followed by the first expansion phase (1973-1981). Similarly to the 1950s 
(see Chapter 1) the economic situation in 1970s was heavily influenced by politics, where 
OPEC members unilaterally increased the oil price. According to Eichengreen (2004:37) 
“…the period starting in 1973 was characterized by sharp commodity price hikes. In addition 
to the oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, there was a commodity price boom of 1973-
1974.” In this era both – OECD and non-OECD countries which disposed of oil reserves – 
took advantage of this situation – where politics drove oil price high – in that sense that they 
established SWFs on the basis of their surplus oil revenue. The findings in Figure 4 suggest 
that this era has seen a balanced growth in the number of SWFs between OECD and non-
OECD countries. 
                                                 
18 More than 90 per cent of commodity SWF are financed through oil/gas. 
19 According to Aizenman and Glick (2008:8) “[c]ountries that […] specialize in fuel exports are more likely to 
have established sovereign wealth funds.” 
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 Unlike the period between 1973-1981, the subsequent era (1982-1999) – described as a 
stagnation phase – saw a decrease in oil prices except for 1990, and only modest growth in the 
volume of assets controlled by SWFs. In mere numbers of SWFs established in this period, it 
seems only to be a stagnation phase for OECD countries. Most of the SWFs were established 
in non-OECD countries. Figure 4 shows that seven out of eight SWF in that period were 
located in non-OECD countries. However, Norway with its 1990 established Government 
Pension Fund constitutes a large exception. The Norwegian government founded its SWF in 
the context of increasing oil prices. Unlike the other years in this formation phase 1990 saw 
an upsurge in oil prices (see Appendix A). Other sizable commodity based SWFs established 
during those years were financed through copper or diamond revenues (see Figure 4).  
   
Nevertheless, the period 2000-2007 experienced a stable rise in oil price and a parallel 
dramatic rise in SWFs (compare Appendix A with Figure 5). In contrast to previous periods, 
where the growth of SWF volume related to OECD and non-OECD countries was more 
balanced, described as the second expansion phase this period saw a shift in that balance in 
favour to non-OECD countries. After 2000 SWF assets related to non-OECD outstripped 
those of OECD countries. The same was true for the number of newly established SWFs. Out 
of the 14 commodity financed SWFs, 13 are located in non-OECD states. Hence, these 
findings suggest that the period between 2000-2007 witnessed a growing imbalance between 
OECD and non-OECD states in both volume and number of newly established SWFs. 
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Figure 4. Historical Trajectory of Commodity funded SWFs (1953-2007) 
 
 
OECD countries Non OECD countries 
 Year Country Name Source volume Year Country Name Source Volume 
1953 Kuwait  Kuwait Investment 
Office 
Oil 213-250 
1953-1973 
Foundation 
Phase 
 
1956 Kiribati Revenue Equalisation 
Fund 
Phosphates 0.6 
1974 US Permanent Wyoming 
Mineral Trust Fund 
Minerals 4 1976 United Arab Emirates  Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
Oil 500-1000 
1976 Canada Alberta Heritage Fund Oil 17 1980 Oman State General Reserve 
Fund 
Oil/Gas 6 
1976 US Alaska Permanent 
Reserve Fund 
Oil 37 1980 Saudi Arabia Kingdom Holding 
Company 
Oil 25 
1973-1981 
First 
Expansion 
Phase 
 
 
 
 1981 Lybia Lybian Investment 
Authority 
Oil 50 
1990 Norway Government Pension 
Fund 
Oil 373 1983 Brunei Brunei Investment 
Authority 
Oil 25-35 
1985 Chile Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund 
Copper 16 
1993 Botswana Pula Fund Diamonds 6 
1995 Colombia Oil Stabilisation Fund Oil 2 
1998 Venezuela Investment Fund for 
Macroeconomic 
Stabilisation 
Oil/Gas 0.8 
1998 Gabun Fund for Future 
Generations 
Oil 0.5 
1982-1999 
 
Stagnation 
 
Phase of 
modest 
growth in 
assets 
(except 1990) 
 
1999 Azerbaijan State Oil Fund Oil 2 
           
  
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
 
Oil Stabilisation Fund 
 
 
 
 
Oil 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
Quatar 
 
 
 
 
Quatar Investment 
Authority 
 
 
 
 
Oil 
 
 
 
 
40-60 
2000 Algeria Fonds de Régulation 
des Recettes 
 
Oil 44 
2000 Iran  Oil Stabilisation Fund Oil 10 
2000 Kazakhstan  National Oil Fund Oil 23 
2002 United Arab Emirates  Mubadala Oil 10 
2003 Iraq Development Fund for 
Iraq 
Oil 8 
2004 Russia Stabilisation Fund Oil/Gas 157 
2004 Nigeria  Nigeria Excess Crude 
Fund 
Oil 13 
2005 East Timor Timor- Leste Petrolium 
Fund 
Oil 2 
2006 Chile Chile Pension Reserve 
Fund 
Copper 1.4 
2006 United Arab Emirates Investment Corporation 
of Dubai 
Oil n.a. 
2006 Mauretania National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon Reserves 
Oil/Gas 0.3 
 
 
 
 
 
2000-2007 
 
Second 
Expansion 
Phase 
 
 
 
2007 Angola Reserve Fund for Oil Oil n.a. 
Sources: Compiled from various sources most notably Fernandez (2008). 
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Figure 5, Numbers of SWFs established (1953-2007) 
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2.4.2. Non-Commodity financed Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
The previous sections have emphasized the role of SWFs financed through revenues 
generated from the extraction of natural resources, in particular oil. There is a strong 
relationship between oil prices and the formation of SWFs. This strong interdependence 
between oil prices and SWFs has led various commentators to dub these funds as natural 
resource funds20. The majority of SWFs are financed with money from natural resources, 
especially oil or gas. On the one hand, abundant natural resource endowment explains the 
ability of large sums of capital which can be transferred into a SWF. But on the other hand, it 
overlooks countries such as Singapore or China, which also have SWFs but do not dispose of 
affluent oil or other natural resources, such as diamonds. A substantial part of sovereign 
wealth can be found in states21 which finance their SWFs from activities other than the 
extraction of natural resources. Consequently, some observers, most notably Rozanov 
(2005:1), emphasise that SWFs should not be called or reduced to natural resource funds.  
 
Similarly to natural resource financed SWFs, non-commodity financed SWFs depend on the 
availability of surplus capital. In the case of SWFs financed by oil revenues, oil price 
dynamics determine the availability of resources which can be transferred to a SWF. But 
unlike SWFs financed through oil revenue, as is the case in non-commodity financed SWFs, it 
is more difficult to attribute the availability of surplus capital to one variable. Here the 
availability of capital resources, which can be transferred into a SWF, depends on fiscal 
policies, such as the transfer of taxation surplus, or capital generated from privatisation and 
exchange reserve surpluses. 
 
The identification of a singular variable is more difficult because non-commodity financed 
SWFs have various sources of funding. Although accepting that indirectly most of the 
research22, in particular Aizenman and Glick (2008:2), on non-commodity financed SWFs 
focuses on China, and thereby concentrating on the relationship between the variable of 
‘foreign exchange reserves’ and SWFs. This research reveals interesting aspects about some 
SWFs. For instance, the two largest SWFs – the Chinese Investment Corporation, and the 
Government Investment Corporation of Singapore – are financed by exchange reserve 
surpluses (see Figure 6). These countries, especially China but also Korea, have started to 
 
20 That is critizised by Rozanov (2005:1). 
21 Most notably China and Singapore. 
22 Truman, Edwin (2008a); Setser, Brad (2008a). 
hoard exchange reserves, especially in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997/1998 (Aizenman 2002:371; Jaenne 2007:3).23  
 
At the end of 1994, for instance, global reserves, excluding gold, amounted only US $1254 
billion, whereas international reserves in 2002 nearly doubled to more than US $2223 billion 
(Aizenman 2002). Developing countries, particularly in East Asia were the main drivers of 
that phenomenon (Aizenman 2002:372; Jaenne 2007:38). In 2008, China, with US $1400 
billion, holds the largest foreign exchange reserves worldwide (Setser 2008:206). Until 2007 
– in other words, before China established its SWF – the bulk of this money was 
conservatively invested in low yielding US treasury bonds. However, the holding of large 
sums of foreign exchange reserves is costly because of the “difference between the return on 
reserves and the return on more profitable alternative investment opportunities” (Jaenne 
2007:25, 42, 47). According to James (2009: [1]) “[s]ince 2000, Chinese assets abroad have 
earned very poor returns -- and with the depreciation of the dollar, by some measures they 
have even performed negatively”. Consequently, in 2007 China, with the establishment of its 
SWF, took the first step into the direction of asset diversification in order to gain higher 
returns. It transferred 2007 US $200 billions from its reserve stock to the China Investment 
Corporation (CIC 2008: [1]). The CIC diversified into a variety of channels with the objective 
of maximizing return. These channels include equity investments, direct investments, and real 
estate investments (CIC 2008a: [1]). 
 
China’s SWF is large with further potential for growth, but by no means can it be described as 
the largest. Therefore, in a comprehensive SWF study, an exclusive focus on the variable of 
foreign exchange reserve holdings would under-appreciate other factors, which play an 
important role in contributing to the asset growth of SWFs. For example, many of the non-
commodity funded SWFs, such as the US New Mexico Permanent Trust Fund, the Malaysian 
Khasana Nasional, the Australian- Queensland Investment Corporation, Future Fund and 
Victorian Funds Management Operation, the French Pension Reserve Fund, the New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, the Irish National Pension Reserve Fund, the United Arab Emirates-
Dubai Istithmar World, and Dubai International Capital, are not directly financed through 
                                                 
23 There are interesting controversies about the underlying reasons for huge amounts of exchange reserve 
holdings. While there are those, such as Aizenman (2004; 2005; 2007), who describe hoarding of exchange 
reserves by emerging economies as a precautionary approach against capital flights in a world of volatile 
exchange rates, others, most notably Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003), who describe the massive 
hoarding of exchange reserves, which enable an undervalued exchange rate, as mercantile strategy to promote 
exports. 
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exchange reserve surpluses (State Investment Council 2008a:[1], State Investment Council 
2008b:[1], State Investment Council 2008c:[1], Queensland Investment Corporation 2008: 
[1], Victorian Fund Management Corporation 2008:[1], Fonds de Reserve 2008:[1], 
NZSuperfund 2008:[1], National Pension Reserve Fund 2008:[1], Futurefund 2008:[1]). 
 
The first non-commodity funded SWF, for example, was established during the 1950s, the 
same decade of the first oil financed SWFs. In contrast to the latter group, the first non-
commodity financed SWF was established in an OECD country. The US New Mexico 
Permanent Trust Fund can be characterised as the first Western based SWF in the foundation 
phase 1958-1973 (see Figure 6). In 2008 this fund derives its capital from different sources. 
On the one hand the New Mexico Permanent Trust Fund profits indirectly from natural 
resources through taxing private business through leasing fees for mineral resources, and 
taxes collected on natural resources (State Investment Council 2008a:[1], State Investment 
Council 2008b:[1]). On the other hand, this fund derives additional capital from annual 
payments made by tobacco companies (State Investment Council 2008c:[1]). 
 
The second phase from 1974-1981 (see Figure 6) saw the growth of two SWFs in a non-
OECD country: Singapore. Singapore’s first SWF Temasek is directly funded by the 
government (Fernandez 2008:35), whereas the second SWF – the Government Investment 
Corporation – manages Singapore’s foreign exchange reserves (GIC 2008a:[1]).  
 
The third phase from 1982-2000 experienced no discernable change. In this period Australia 
established two SWFs. Its first, the Queensland Investment Corporation, can be described as 
the largest institutional investment manager in Australia owned and funded by the 
government of Queensland (Queensland Investment Corporation 2008:[1]). Similarly to the 
Queensland Investment Corporation, Australia’s second SWF,  the Victorian Fund 
Management Corporation, receives funds from public agencies, particularly state-related 
insurers or public sector clients, such as universities (Victorian Fund Management 
Corporation 2008:[1]). Only one non-OECD SWF – the Malaysian Khasana Nasional – was 
created during the 1990s. The Malaysian government financed this SWF with revenues 
derived from privatisation of government companies (Fernandez 2008:54). 
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The period 2000-2007 saw rapid growth of SWFs in both OECD and non-OECD countries. 
The number of established SWFs in this phase overtrumped the total amount of previous 
phases. Three out of the five SWFs established by OECD states can be described – with a 
volume between US $30-55 billion – as medium sized SWFs, whereas non-OECD China 
established one large SWF with a volume of US $200 billion (see Figure 6). Three OECD 
members – Ireland, France, and New Zealand – were the first which established SWFs in this 
period. The Irish government funds its National Pension Reserve Fund by a “statutory setting 
aside and investing of 1% of GNP annually” (National Pension Reserve Fund 2008:[1]). 
Similarly to the Irish SWFs, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund is “financed by capital 
contributions from the Government” (NZSuperfund 2008:[1]). In contrast, the French Fonds 
de Reserve derives its resources from various channels: “[a] portion of the 2 percent social tax 
on income from estates and investments […] [s]urplus sums from the French National Old 
Age Funds […] [p]roceeds from the sale of certain state-owned assets through privatization” 
(Fonds de Reserve 2008:[1]).  
 
These were followed by two non-OECD funds from the United Arab Emirates – Isthithmar 
World and Dubai International Capital – and another Australian fund, the Future Fund, which 
is financed by budget surplus and privatisation revenues, for instance Telstra in 2006 
(Futurefund 2008 [1]). South Korea is the only OECD member with a SWF located outside 
the Western hemisphere. In other words, the Korean Investment Corporation is an OECD 
related SWF, but located in a non-traditional Western state. Like the Singaporean 
Government Investment Corporation, the Korean Investment Corporation manages a part of 
South Korea’s foreign exchange reserves (Korea Investment Corporation 2008: [1]). The last 
and politically most discussed SWF was created in 2007 by the Chinese government. Figure 1 
illustrates that a wide public debate about SWFs started with the establishment of the Chinese 
fund and some high profile SWF investments.  
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Figure 6, Historical Trajectory of Non-Commodity funded SWFs (1958-2007) 
 OECD Countries Non OECD Countries 
 Year Country Name Source Volume Year Country Name Source Volume 
1958-1973 
 
Foundation 
Phase 
1958 US New Mexico 
Permanent 
Trust Fund 
Fiscal 16      
     1974 Singapore Temasek Fiscal 160 
1974-1981 
 
Small number 
of SWFs 
     1981 Singapore Government 
of Singapore 
Investment 
Corporation 
Reserves/Fiscal 200-330 
1992 Australia Queensland 
Investment 
Corporation 
Fiscal 65 1993 Malaysia Khazanah 
Nasional 
Fiscal 23 
1982-2000 
 
No discernable 
change 
1994  Australia Victorian 
Funds 
Management 
Corporation 
Fiscal 36      
2001 France Pension 
Reserve Fund 
Fiscal 51 2003 United Arab 
Emirates 
Dubai  
Istithmar 
World  
Fiscal 6 
2001 New Zealand New Zealand 
Superannuation 
Fund 
Fiscal 10 2004 United Arab 
Emirates 
Dubai  
International 
Capital 
Fiscal 13 
2001 Ireland  National 
Pension 
Reserve Fund 
Fiscal 31 2007 China China 
Investment 
Corporation 
Reserves 
/Fiscal 
200 
2006 Australia Future Fund Fiscal 55      
2000-2007 
 
Rapid growth 
of SWFs 
2006 South Korea Korea 
Investment 
Corporation 
Reserves 
/Fiscal 
20      
Sources: Compiled from various sources most notably Fernandez (2008). 
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Chapter 2 has supported the application of the widely used categorisation of SWFs into 
commodity financed funds and non-commodity financed funds. This division is legitimised 
because different dynamics and variables influence the formation of SWFs. On the one hand, 
the faction labelled ‘commodity financed SWFs’ can be described as an homogeneous group, 
since more than 90 per cent of the assets are derived directly from oil or gas revenues. On the 
other hand, the group characterised as ‘non-commodity financed SWFs’ comprises a more 
heterogeneous cluster of funds. In contrast to commodity financed SWFs, non-commodity 
financed SWFs derive their funding from number of different sources, such as taxes derived 
from natural resources, and revenue derived from privatisation and foreign exchange reserves. 
By emphasizing this variety, a comprehensive analysis should not exclusively focus on one 
variable, in particular ‘foreign exchange reserves’. Although an investigation of the foreign 
exchange reserve dynamics reveals important insights in singular cases, such as in the 
Chinese or Singaporean one, it cannot embrace the whole picture. 
 
Having discussed the economic basis of SWFs, it must be admitted that SWFs should be 
analysed in a political context, since all SWFs are related to governments. However, states 
owning SWFs are very heterogenous too, in matters of geography, in respect of the form of 
governance – whether democracy or autocracy – and in relation to their economic status. 
Hence, by relating SWFs to a political context these three dimensions are essentially 
embraced. Therefore the dichotomy of OECD versus non-OECD countries was introduced. 
This categorisation covers geographical, economic, and governmental elements which enable 
the structuring of this heterogeneity in a coherent way. While OECD countries with SWFs are 
often associated with the notion of western, highly industrialised countries coined by liberal 
capitalism, non-OECD states with SWFs are frequently described as non-western, emerging 
countries with authoritarian governments. 
 
The integration of this dichotomy – of OECD versus non-OECD states – into a chronological 
matrix has revealed some interesting dynamics. Section 2.4.1. has analysed this dichotomy 
with reference to commodity financed SWFs. It has shown that although oil financed SWFs 
from non-OECD countries outgrew the number and volume of SWFs related to OECD 
members, both (OECD and non-OECD) experienced an increase in SWF assets. The findings 
of Section 2.4.1. suggest, that, in the case of commodity financed SWFs the dynamics of oil 
or commodity prices had until 2000 similar effects on SWFs whether located in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Section 2.4.2. has investigated this relationship in regard to non-
commodity financed SWFs. Here, a comparison – whether certain dynamics have similar 
effects on OECD and non-OECD countries – is more difficult, since the sources of funding 
are more heterogeneous. Although the number of OECD SWFs outweigh the figure of non-
OECD SWFs, concerning volume, the situation is converse. In terms of total assets controlled 
by SWFs, non-OECD clearly outplay OECD countries. In general, therefore, it seems that 
some dynamics – in particular oil prices – have similar effects on different countries.  
 
While Chapter 1 revealed that the first SWFs emerged in a highly politicised world, Chapter 2 
– by adding a political context – has integrated those findings into a contemporary 
framework. This framework has focused on the relationship between different types of SWFs 
related to various states. However, SWFs are not the only players in the international financial 
arena. Therefore, Chapter 3 analyses SWFs in relation to other financial players, in order to 
integrate SWFs into an international financial context
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 3. SWFs among Other Financial Actors 
 
 
The rapid growth of SWF assets to an approximate volume of US $3 trillion (Maslakovic 
2007:5) in the last decade represents an issue which should become one of the hot financial 
topics  in IPE, since there are clear intersections between economics and politics. Despite 
growing interest, most of the scholary work about SWFs has been undertaken exclusively by 
economists. But most of the economic approaches, no matter how sophisticated they are, have 
problems when it comes to the integration of political variables. That often leads to an 
inadequate use of the term SWF since various actors that share some similarities with SWFs 
are often labelled as SWFs. This debate frequently results in disagreements in terms of what 
SWFs are, and what they are not. Since 2007 an inexact usage of the term SWFs contributed 
to some extent to an inflationary and inappropriate application of the term SWF, in particular 
in the media (see Graphic 11). 
 
Graphic 11, Number of Articles related to SWFs in the Financial Times 
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 Source: The Financial Times 2008. 
 
Thus the main objective of studying SWFs is to examine in more detail the extent to which 
they differ, and in particular to examine the role of other financial actors and their relationship 
to SWFs. Therefore, Chapter 3 is divided into two sections. Sections 3.1.,3.2, and 3.2.1 deal in 
the first instance with the question of to what extent SWFs differ from other financial 
institutions or actors, such as reserve banks and pension funds. The purpose of these sections 
is to identify the intersecting elements among SWFs and some of those financial institutions 
(in Section 3.4.) in order to categorize them. Section 3.3. draws attention to the ways in which 
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the heterogeneous group of SWFs can be categorized in order to differentiate them, since 
various financial actors have diverse dynamics. In order for an adequate analysis of SWFs, the 
multiple dynamics linked with SWFs have to be appreciated.  
 
 
3.1. Differences between Sovereign Wealth Funds and Other Financial 
Actors 
 
In the last three decades SWFs have grown to an impressive size of approximately US $3 
trillion, so that one of The Economist’s (2008) cover stories had the title “Invasion of the 
Sovereign Wealth-Funds”. However, an inadequate use of the term SWFs accompanies the 
increasing public interest. A tendency to dump all state related pools of capital, such as 
reserve banks or public pension funds, into the category of SWF is one outcome. The 
incorporation of all these financial institutions, into the SWF debate, by including them in 
different SWFs ratings24 can lead to confusion as to whether to describe one actor as SWF or 
not. There are some intersecting elements among SWFs and some of those financial 
institutions, but not enough to put them altogether into the category labelled ‘SWFs’. 
 
Hence it seems important to shed light on this problematical issue. Graphic 12, Global Asset 
Holdings illustrates that SWFs act in the financial field among many other players. SWFs 
have an estimated volume of about US $3 trillion (Maslakovic 2008:1); a large financial actor, 
but by no means the largest.  Other institutional investors, such as private and public pension 
funds with combined assets exceeding US $20 trillion (Maslakovic 2007:5), have much more 
financial leverage than SWFs. Even the official global Reserve holdings, managed by central 
banks, surpass the volume of SWFs (The Economist 2008a [1]). Consequently, this section 
illustrates some distinctive features shared by those financial players, thereby enabling 
differentiation between them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For example in Truman 2008:4; Maslakovic 2008:3; Blundell-Wignall et al. 2008:121; IMF 2007:48. 
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Graphic 12, Global Asset Holding in Trillion US $ 
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Sources : *Maslakovic (2007:5); **Economist (2008);*** (Blundell-Wignall 2008:117); 
****Maslakovic (2008:1). 
 
 
3.2. Similarities between Sovereign Wealth Funds and Other Financial 
Actors 
 
Pension funds, reserve holdings of central banks, and the assets of SWFs are all related to the 
government in that sense that governments play a central role in the supply of financial 
resources allowing them to operate. That includes the governmental allocation of Foreign 
Exchange Reserve and Fiscal Revenue, such as tax exemption for both pension funds and 
SWFs (Fleischer 2008), as well as the channelling of commodity revenues, in particular oil, 
into these financial institutions. Hence for analytical reasons these three financial institutions 
– reserve banks, SWFs, and pension funds – are categorised under the label ‘government 
related pools of capital’ on the horizontal level in Figure 7.  
 
Having differentiated among the actors on the horizontal level, Figure 7 illustrates that each of 
these actors can also be characterised along different vertical dimensions. Each of these 
vertical dimensions revolves around a key variable (objective, investment horizon, investment 
type, asset holdings, and source). Together, these variables constitute a complex of underlying 
logics which are influenced by developments in particular industries. 
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At the ‘source’ dimension, for instance, the effects of a commodity price increase, for 
example oil, differ between the SWFs of oil producing countries such as Kuwait, and the 
SWFs of export manufacturing countries, such as China. Whereas an additional inflow of oil 
money would increase the asset volume of the Kuwaiti SWF, at the same time, these 
dynamics would have other effects on the Chinese SWF, which is financed by a foreign 
exchange reserve overhang based on export activities. These export activities, in turn, are 
enabled to a certain extent by the availability of cheap oil. These findings suggest that 
different developments in particular industries shape various characteristics of SWFs in 
distinct ways. However, it turns out that the developments which influence these key variables 
are, in reality, often not clear cut.  
 
Figure 7 shows that the horizontal actor-classification into five different units hardly matches 
the characteristics of each dimension in a coherent way. On the one hand, although being 
characterised as SWFs, stabilisation funds, investment holding companies as well as saving 
funds show great heterogeneity on the vertical levels. On the other hand, while central banks 
and stabilisation funds share a lot of similarities, in particular patterns of asset holding and 
investment types, they are expressed as separate actors on the horizontal level. These 
semblances and inconsistencies sometimes lead to confusion as to whether to describe some 
actors such as central banks or pension funds as SWFs. Hence, the purpose of the following 
sections is to describe each of the five actors separately in order to understand the 
categorisation. 
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Figure 7, Categorisation of Government related Pools of Capital 
 
Sources: Compiled from various sources, IMF (2008), Fernandez (2008), Pascuzzo (2008). 
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 3.2.1. Relationship ‘Investment Type’ and ‘Investment Allocation’ 
 
Before analysing the actors separately it is useful to indicate a core relationship on the vertical 
level between ‘investment type’ and ‘investment allocation’. The following sections support 
the thesis of a causal relationship between the variables ‘investment type’ and ‘asset 
allocation’. Each of the nine selected cases (see Figures 8, 9, and 10) illustrates that, on the 
one hand, SWFs with little interest in direct investment (see Figures 9, and 10) hold their 
assets preferably in international assets, while SWFs which participate through direct 
investments and majority shareholding actively in the economy (see Figure 8), tend to hold a 
substantial part of their assets domestically.  
 
In order to integrate these findings into an empirical IPE framework, the analysis builds on a 
well known theoretical tenet. Prominent representatives of industrial organisation literature, 
most notably Hymer (1960), as well as economists such as Krugman and Graham (1991:8), or 
Stolen (1969), differentiate between two patterns of long term capital movements: portfolio 
investment and direct investment: 
 
Direct investment is ownership that carries with it actual control over what is 
owned; this aspect of control distinguishes direct investment from portfolio 
investment, which is simply the establishment of a claim on an asset for the 
purpose of realizing some return (Graham and Krugman 1991:8). 
 
Similarly, Hymer (1960:1,6) emphasizes that most of the literature describes ‘portfolio 
investment’ as substantially influenced by seeking the highest rate of return, but specifying 
direct investment as connected to motives of control. In the same fashion Farrell (1997:19) 
refers to portfolio investment as “a flow of capital from a country of low financial returns to 
one of higher returns…”  
 
However, such a clear cut dichotomy between profit interest and control interest may be 
problematical, since reality is more complex. Caves (1996:134) would argue that both 
portfolio and direct investment are two different ways of claiming rents in a foreign market, 
which automatically mean that direct investment is also guided by profit motives. 
Nevertheless, analytical reasons justify such a simplification into two categories, because “if 
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investor control is not important, investors may require only a financial and not strategic 
motivation for FDI” (Farrell 1997:26). Therefore, these findings suggest that ‘direct 
investments’ are driven to a certain extent by motivations of controlling assets, whereas 
’portfolio investments’ are motivated solely by return aspects. 
 
The first three actors in the upcoming sub-sections – investment holding companies, saving 
funds, and stabilisation funds – are SWFs followed by central banks and pension funds. After 
a short definition, the five characterising dimensions are analysed in order to differentiate 
each actor. 
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3.3. Types of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
3.3.1. Investment Holding Companies 
 
Investment holding companies such as the Singaporean Temasek or the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) Mubadala have received considerable attention through high profile investments in 
international investment banks such as Merrill Lynch and Barclays, or companies such as 
Ferrari (Burton 2008; Dulka 2008). Most of the literature25 about holding companies focuses 
exclusively on private sector holdings (Daems 1978). A private sector holding company can 
be defined in the widest sense as a “financial institution that manages a portfolio of stocks in 
order to control the companies in which they hold a share of the equity capital” (Daems 
1978:2).   
 
If translated to state owned ‘investment holding companies’ that would mean governments 
participate through ‘investment holding companies’ directly in the industrial commercial and 
financial field in order to control these companies. Nonetheless, the application of this 
definition of government owned ‘investment holding companies’ seems justified since some 
of them share similar aspects with private holdings (see Figure 8). The UAE Mubadala 
holding company, for instance, comprises an official portfolio of 56 domestic or international 
operating companies in the energy, industry, real estate and various other sectors. From these 
56 international and national companies Mubadala has 100 per cent ownership of 21 firms, 
and owns stakes of more than 50 per cent in 10 companies (Mubadala 2008:[1]). Taken 
together Mubadala holds a controlling stake in more than half of the companies. Likewise, the 
Singaporean Temasek has a controlling part in 17 entities out of its 32 major national and 
international companies (Temasek 2008:[1]). These findings suggest that Mubadala and 
Temasek are the controlling shareholders in more than half of the companies listed in their 
portfolio. 
 
That goes hand in hand with the question of where those companies are located. Companies 
which are directly controlled by a state owned investment holding company are most likely to 
be based in the territory of the sovereign owner. Aspects related to the sovereignty might play 
a central role in that. For example, if a company that is owned by sovereign A, operates in the 
territory of sovereign B, there is an intersection between two sovereign powers which might 
                                                 
25 Daems 1978 et.al. 
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lead to political tensions. The controversy involving the global terminal operator Dubai Ports 
– itself directly owned by an investment holding company ‘Dubai World’ – and its takeover 
of US ports in 2006 illustrates this tension (Friedman 2006). A broad debate comprising 
media and US politicians from Congress and the Senate, such John Warner and Peter King, 
began as to whether this takeover poses a security risk to the US (Weisman 2006:1). In the 
light of attention and public pressure, at the end of 2006 ‘Dubai Ports World’ officials 
pronounced their withdrawal from the ports operations in the US (Jackson 2008:1). 
 
Thus enterprises totally owned by a SWF may find it difficult to operate in the territory of 
another sovereign power, since this would indicate a overlapping of sovereignty issues. Figure 
8, Selected International Investment Holding Companies underlines this hypothesis, since 
there is a relationship between controlling ownership and location. Actually, the companies 
fully owned by Mubadala are explicit UAE corporations; firms where Mubadala holds more 
than 50 per cent are in most of the cases joint ventures with international companies, but also 
headquartered in the UAE (Mubadala 2008:[1]). These findings show that the companies 
controlled by Mubadala are domestic UAE firms, although some of them are operating 
internationally. These patterns of domestic investment also correspond to the Malaysian 
government holding company Khasanah Nasional that holds 89 per cent of its assets in 
Malaysia (Khasanah 2008:[1]). In the same fashion, Temasek holds a substantial part of its 
total investments in domestic assets (see Figure 8). 
 
Hence, unlike stabilisation and saving funds, government owned investment holding 
companies invest a substantial part of their resources in domestic assets. These patterns of 
resource allocation correlate with a high percentage of controlling ownership by investment 
holding companies. While, holding companies, such as Mubadala or Temasek, have a 
controlling stake in more than half of their investments, stabilisation and saving funds only 
make portfolio investments (see Figures 9 and 10).  
 
Similar to that, on the ‘source’ level (see Figure 7) there is great difference between 
investment holding companies and the other two types of SWFs. The funding structure of 
investment holding companies is probably the most multifaceted among SWFs. It differs from 
country to country, where governments channel or transfer fiscal surpluses, commodity 
revenues or foreign exchange reserves into holding companies. In stark contrast to savings or 
stabilisation funds, investment holding companies also have complementary patterns of 
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funding. In addition to the initial or ongoing governmental allocations of capital, some 
investment holding companies issue bonds, as in the case of Khasanah (Fernandez 2008:54). 
This leads to the question of their objectives. 
 
Hymer’s (1960) differentiation between the two types of international capital movements –  
the return oriented ‘portfolio investment’, and the control motivated ‘direct investment’ – 
would lead to the conclusion that most of the investments of holding companies are motivated 
not necessarily by objectives of the highest return. Fernandez (2008:5) and also the IMF 
(2008:46) would agree, that in the case of government owned investment holding companies, 
the objectives of maximising return are strongly influenced by strategic issues of developing, 
transforming or diversifying industries. 
 
 
Figure 8. Selected International Investment Holding Companies 
 Temasek 
 
(Singapore) 
Mubadala 
 
(UAE) 
Khasanah 
Nasional 
(Malaysia) 
Objective “maximise long-term 
shareholder value” 
 
“investments that 
deliver strong 
financial returns” 
“drive shareholder 
creation” 
Investment Horizont Long term Long term Long term 
Foreign Asset 
Holdings 
67%  n.a. 11% 
Domestic Asset 
Holdings 
33% n.a. 89 % 
Investment Type direct/portfolio 
 
Controlling 
shareholder in 17 of 
the major 32 
(inter)national 
companies 
direct/portfolio 
 
Controlling 
shareholder in 31 
from 56 
(inter)national 
companies 
 
Portfolio 
 
 
Source Fiscal Oil Fiscal 
Sources: Temasek (2008); Mubadala (2008); Khazanah (2008); Truman(2008:4). 
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 3.3.2. Saving Funds 
 
Saving funds are undoubtedly the largest players in the SWF arena. The four largest saving 
funds – the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-
Global, the Singaporean Government Investment Corporation, and the Kuwait Investment 
Authority – comprise a volume of US $1793 billion26 which is more than 60 per cent of the 
global sovereign wealth assets (Truman 2008:2). These four saving funds, making the largest 
bulk out of 44 international SWFs, show the high concentration of sovereign wealth in a small 
number of actors. 
 
According to Fernandez (2008:5), governments allocate wealth generated by commodity 
export income, foreign exchange reserve surpluses or fiscal transfers, into a saving fund over 
a long period for future needs. These needs can comprise future pension liabilities, safe-
guarding future rent income, or other requirements (Blundell 2008, IMF 2008). Although 
some of the saving funds’ objectives may not be so clear, all of the saving funds share the 
objective of higher return which is based on a diversified investment portfolio (Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance 2008; Government Investment Corporation 2008; Kuwait Investment 
Authority 2008). 
 
However, one aspect that complicates a clear-cut analysis of saving funds is the fact that some 
of saving funds are intermingled with other types of SWFs. The Kuwaiti SWF described here 
as a saving fund, for instance, has two sections: the General Reserve Fund a stabilisation 
fund, and the Future Generation Fund a saving fund (Kuwait Investment Authority 2008). 
However, despite these intersections, which make a clear estimation of the savings fund 
volume difficult, some of the characteristics of both saving funds and stabilisation funds differ 
from the other investment holding companies. Unlike investment holding companies (see 
Figure 8), saving funds and stabilisation funds concentrate their capital exclusively in 
portfolio investment (see Figure 9). 
 
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund explicitly invests in financial assets that comprise 
equities, fixed income and real estate (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2008). Furthermore, 
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2008) implemented an investment limit for its SWF 
                                                 
26 Calculated with the highest estimates of  Truman (2008:2). 
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which prohibits the acquisition of more than 10 per cent of a company. The same may be true 
for the Kuwait Investment Authority (Fernandez 2008:29), and for the Singaporean 
Government Investment Corporation (2008:11). This suggests that most of the investments of 
saving funds are characterised by patterns of minority shareholdings interested more in return- 
than control-aspects. But, what does that mean for the asset allocation process? 
 
Chapter 3.2.1. (Relationship ‘Investment Type’ and ‘Investment Allocation’) already 
indicated a relationship between the investment type whether portfolio or direct investment, 
and the patterns of asset holding, whether this investment is domestic or international. 
Investment holding companies (see Figure 8) have a high direct investment ratio which means 
that they control companies via majority share ownership. In addition, investment holding 
companies invest an essential part of their money in domestic assets.  
 
In contrast to investment holding companies, saving funds can be characterised as funds 
focused on return and not control. While investment holding companies also invest 
domestically, saving funds tend to invest most of their assets internationally (see Figure 9 and 
Truman 2008:4; Beck and Fidora 2008:10). The Norwegian and Singaporean saving funds 
allocated all of their investments into international assets. But also the Kuwaiti saving fund 
has the majority of its money allocated to international assets (Truman 2008:4). Hence, 
Hymer (1960) would refer to saving funds as portfolio investors, interested in high returns, 
rather than control. The fact that most of the saving funds assets are invested internationally 
leads to the conclusion that saving funds invest in the highest return promising assets on an 
international level. These findings are strongly supported by Fred Halliday (2002: 55) who 
writes that “Gulf Cooperation Council states and private investors have invested over $2.000 
billion in Western capital markets, and very little at home, because of the comparative 
advantages of security and return.” These findings suggest that there are factors, in particular 
higher return, which make investments on an international, rather than domestic scale more 
attractive for saving funds. 
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 Figure 9. Selected International Saving Funds 
 Government 
Pension Fund – 
Global  
(Norway) 
Government 
Investment 
Corporation 
(Singapore) 
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority27 
 
Objective Return Return Return 
Investment Horizont Long term Long term Long term 
Foreign Asset 
Holdings 
100%* 100%* 80%* 
Domestic Asset 
Holdings 
n.a. n.a. 20%* 
Investment Type Portfolio 
 
93% Portfolio 
7% n.a 
Portfolio 
Source Oil Fiscal/Reserves Oil 
Sources: Norwegian Ministry of Finance (August 2008); Investment Report GIC (2008); Fernandez (2008:30); 
*Truman (2008:4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The KIA manages two investment funds. According to Fernandez (2008:29) the General Reserve Fund is 
similar to a stabilisation portfolio, whereas the second, the Future Generation Fund (which accounts for about 
80% of the whole assets) is a saving fund. 
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 3.3.3. Stabilisation Funds 
 
Rising commodity prices have undoubtedly contributed to the growth of stabilisation funds 
and their assets. The three largest oil/gas based stabilisation funds – the Russian Stabilisation 
Fund, the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan28, and the Excess Crude Fund of 
Nigeria29 – were established between 2000 and 2004 (Truman 2008:2), a period characterised 
by a continuous rise in oil prices (see Williams 2007). Stabilisation funds can be usually 
found in countries abundant with resources, in particular oil/gas, copper or diamonds (IMF 
2008:46). In fact, all of the stabilisation funds, except the Taiwanese one, are located in 
economies richly resourced with primary commodities (Fernandez 2008:21). 
 
Similar to saving funds, some stabilization funds have intersections with other types of SWFs. 
The stabilisation fund of the Russian Federation, which was originally “established on 
January 1, 2004 as a part of the federal budget to balance the federal budget at the time of 
when oil price falls below a cut-off price” (MinFin 2008: [1]), was split into two sections at 
the beginning of 2008: section one, ‘the Reserve Fund’, continues to play the role of a  
stabilization fund, whereas section two, ‘the National Wealth Fund’, can be characterised as a 
savings fund (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2008:[1]). Although stabilisation funds differ 
from saving funds, both can be described in the broadest term as portfolio investors. For 
example, in contrast to investment holding companies, stabilisation funds and saving funds 
invest passively which means they make no (direct) investments in companies. The Russian 
stabilisation fund, for instance invests only in short term (not exceeding three years) sovereign 
debt securities (MinFin 2008: [1]), which can be liquefied quickly if required. Similar to 
saving funds, stabilisation funds concentrate their assets, in foreign rather than domestic 
investments as Figure 10, Selected International Stabilisation Funds shows. The investments 
in foreign assets may also be determined by macro-economic considerations. 
 
Governments which derive a substantial part of their income from external revenue, based on 
the exploitation of non renewable resources, are confronted with two problems (Davis et al. 
2001). On the one hand, the price volatility of primary commodities constrains their fiscal 
                                                 
28 According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008a) ‘the National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan’ 
can be characterised as a Stabilisation Fund. 
29 According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008b) ‘Excess Crude Fund’ can be characterised as a 
Stabilisation Fund. 
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management, in particular effective budget planning, while on the other hand, the 
exhaustibility of these resources creates questions of whether the current wealth is sustainable 
(Davis et al. 2001). As a consequence, some of those countries channel part of their 
commodity revenues into a stabilisation fund in order to reduce or cushion the impact of 
volatile commodity revenues in the future (Fernandez 2008:5; Davis et al. 2001). 
Furthermore, a stabilisation fund may serve in those economies as a sterilisation vehicle that 
absorbs excessive money supply in times of high external income. For instance, when an 
oil/gas producing country, such as Russia, is confronted with excessive surges of petrol-dollar 
inflows in periods of high oil prices, it is reasonable to establish a stabilisation fund. Without 
such an absorption of excessive liquidity through a SWF, inflationary pressures would lead to 
appreciation of the domestic currency which would undermine the international 
competitiveness in regard to other currencies (Lee 1997:1). That is often referred to as the 
concept of the ‘Dutch Disease’, a term coined by The Economist (1977:82) describing the 
economic situation in Holland at the end of the 1970s, where large quantities of gas had been 
discovered in 1959. The exploitation of these deposits, in particular in the years of high oil 
prices, led to massive inflows of petro-dollars that caused an appreciation of the Dutch 
guilder, which undermined the competitiveness of Dutch manufacturers, since a strong guilder 
made Dutch manufacturing comparably expensive to other countries (The Economist 1977: 
82-85). Thus the question of “how to spend […] oil money” but prevent de-industrialisation at 
the same time became a crucial question (The Economist 1977:86). These findings suggest 
that SWFs, in particular saving funds and stabilization funds, also function as a tool to prevent 
the ‘Dutch Disease’. 
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 Figure 10. Selected International Stabilisation Funds 
 Russian Reserve 
Fund 
 
Oil Stabilization 
Fund 
(Mexico) 
Economic and 
Social 
Stabilization 
Fund 
(Chile) 
Objective “reducing 
inflationary pressure 
and insulating the 
economy from 
volatility of raw 
material export 
earnings” *** 
“to offset the effects 
of any future drops 
in the price of crude 
oil” ** 
“ensure that public 
spending is no longer 
dependent on the 
fluctuations of 
international copper 
prices” ** 
Investment Horizont    
Foreign Asset 
Holdings 
100%* 100%* 100%* 
Investment Type Foreign Debt 
Securities 
US treasuries Only Passive no 
active Investment** 
Source Oil/Gas  Oil Copper 
Sources: ***Russian Ministry of Finance (2008), **Fernandez (2008:65,80), 
*Truman (2008:4). 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion Investment Holding Companies, Saving Funds, Stabilisation Funds 
 
The previous sections have illustrated the different logics among various types of SWFs. One 
of the underlying logics of SWFs analysed here comprises both: the ‘type’ of investment, 
whether minority or majority, and the ‘location’ of these investments, whether domestic or 
international. Some assumptions of classical capital flow theories help to understand these 
dynamics. These theories, in particular Hymer’s (1960), identify two main types of capital 
flows: portfolio and direct investments. While both types of investments may be influenced 
by return maximisation, direct investments also have motives of controlling assets. 
Furthermore, it was indicated that these two investment types correlate with specific patterns 
of allocation. The nine cases have shown that portfolio investment tends to be international, 
whereas direct investments tend to be domestic.  
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 Therefore, supporters of the assumption of classical capital flow theory would conclude that 
investments on the international level promise higher returns than at home, since portfolio 
investment usually flows there where it can find the highest rate of return. These assumptions 
correlate with the findings, since those assets directly controlled by SWFs are located 
domestically, whereas portfolio investments made by SWFs are internationally. Graphic 13 
illustrates the relationship between the investment type, whether portfolio or direct 
investment, and the allocation of these investments whether international or domestic. 
 
 
 
Graphic 13, Relationship between Asset Allocation and Investment Type 
 
   international   
        Stabilisation Fund  
              Savings Fund 
                                            Investment Hold.C,  
     
  
 
 
                 domestic 
           Direct     Portfolio  
 
 
 
While the results in Figures 9 and 10 show that high fractions of portfolio investments 
correlate with high international allocation of these investments, Figure 8 illustrates that the 
higher the portion of direct investments, the more likely these investments are based 
domestically. Nevertheless, further work needs to be done to establish whether the portfolio 
investments at the international level, in contrast to domestic investments, have yielded higher 
returns in every case.  
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 But it has also been indicated that political aspects related to state sovereignty influence that 
division of capital. On the one hand states, in particular the US, welcome passive portfolio 
investment, such as a 4.9 per cent stake in Citigroup and a 9.9 per cent share in Morgan 
Stanley in 2007 (Joint Committee on Taxation 2008:27). On the other hand, discouraging 
direct investments related to SWFs is illustrated by the ports controversy in 2005 where 
‘Dubai Ports World’, a company owned by a UAE SWF, purchased a controlling stake of 
some port facilities in the US (Teslik 2008), thereby provoking a political uproar. These 
double standards are most visibly enshrined in the US tax law in section 892 (Fleischer 
2008:22). While income on passive portfolio investments of SWF is exempted from tax in the 
US, directly controlled entities of SWFs are taxed at 30 per cent (Fleischer 2008:19,22,23). 
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 3.4. Financial Actors related to Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
 
3.4.1. Central Banks 
 
A central or reserve bank can be defined as a “government bank which regulates a country’s 
banks and manages a nation’s monetary policy” (Chicago Exchange Glossary 2008). The 
main task of a modern central bank is to safeguard the stability of the national currency and 
maintain the liquidity of a country in the international market (Bundesbank 2008; European 
Central Bank 2008). According to Heller (1966:296) the term liquidity refers to “all short-
term assets denominated in a foreign currency and all lines of credit that might be available to 
the residents of a particular country.” 
 
While the primary duty of a modern reserve bank comprises tasks concerning sustaining 
macro economic stability, SWFs focus predominantly on profit maximisation (Jaenne 
2007:42; Aizenman and Glick 2008:3). Most SWFs, except stabilisation funds, are long term 
investors interested in high returns, whereas central banks prefer to hold low yielding short-
term assets, such as treasury bonds denominated in US Dollars, Euro or other currencies, 
which can be liquidated if required (Pascuzzo 2008:6; Jaenne 2007; Aizenman and Glick 
2008:3). These findings suggest that these government related pools of capital – reserve 
banks, and SWFs – have crucially different objectives in their asset management.  
 
However, since 2007 there has been a tendency among journalists, politicians and scholars to 
define some of these reserve banks or administrations of central banks as SWFs. Even, some 
scholars, most notably Rozanov (2005:1), note the blurred relationship between SWFs and 
central banks. According to Rozanov (2005:1) central bank managers start to behave like 
SWF managers. Actually, some of the activities carried out by some monetary authorities of 
both regions – the emerging Asian countries, in particular Hong Kong and China, and Middle 
Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia – resemble those of SWFs. These activities are oriented 
towards return maximisation of the reserve portfolio (Rozanov 2005), rather than pure macro 
economic stabilisation operations. 
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 The Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) which, for instance, carries out the tasks of a 
central bank, is often described by journalists such as Schultes (2008) as a SWF. That may be 
because the spectrum of the SAMA embraces not only the traditional tasks of a Western  
reserve bank. The SAMA has two functions: as a central bank it is responsible for the 
maintenance of the monetary stability by conservative investment in US treasury bonds; as an 
asset manager, the SAMA also focuses on higher returns on its reserve portfolio through asset 
diversification (SAMA 2008). According to the SAMA (2008: [1]): “Once liquidity and 
secondary liquidity have been created, the remaining assets are invested in bonds and 
equities.” These findings suggest that the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia has, besides the 
objectives of a modern reserve bank, also commercial profit maximising aims. 
 
The same is the case with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the central banking 
institution of Hong Kong. US congressperson Saxton (2008) defines the HKMA in a congress 
paper as an SWF. In fact, the operations of the HKMA, in particular the activities of its 
Exchange Fund, can hardly be confined to the tasks carried out by a reserve bank. The 
Exchange Fund, an incorporated agency, manages two portfolios; first, the ‘Backing 
Portfolio’ has the objective of backing the monetary base of Hong Kong by providing 
currency stability and liquidity, and second, the ‘Investment Portfolio’ has the objective to 
make investments in bonds, foreign and domestic equities in order to make the best return 
(HKMA 2008: 20-25). Those non-traditional portfolio investments yielded a 11.8 percent rate 
of return in 2007 (HKMA 2008:6-46). This indicates that return considerations have gained in 
importance. However, the primary concern of the HKMA is still in the nature of monetary 
stability. “While it is obviously important to make the best return we can, it is even more 
important to maintain the monetary stability for the benefit of the economic well-being of 
Hong Kong and its people” (HKMA 2008:25). Although the HKMA has some elements 
which are similar to SWF, it should not be automatically be equated with an SWF. 
 
Another example for imprecise usage of the term SWFs is provided by Sheridan (2008) who 
categorises the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of China as an SWF.  High 
profile equity investments of the SAFE in international companies, most notably in British 
Petrol and French Total, contributed to such allegations (Flaherty 2008). The SAFE, 
subordinated to the State Council and the People’s Bank of China, manages the largest foreign 
exchange reserves amounting US $1809 billion (SAFE 2008: [1]). Until June 2007 the 
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greatest part of those reserves of approximately US $922 billion were denominated in US 
securities, in particular low yielding US treasury bonds (Morrison 2008:1). However, these 
reserve holdings, especially those in US Dollars, have become problematical in the context of 
major shifts in both currencies. These shifts were characterised by a combination of both 
external pressure from the United States, and internal macroeconomic considerations to 
revalue the Yuan against a weakening US Dollar (see Appendix B.). This currency adjustment 
has had a deleterious impact on the Chinese currency reserves, because a revaluation of the 
Yuan reduces at the same time the value of the Chinese assets denominated in US dollars.  
 
Within that context, in September 2007 China established the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC) with the official purpose of “mitigat[ing] risks in China's huge foreign exchange 
reserve” (China-Embassy 2007:[1]). Since its inception, the CIC has been managing a 
substantial part of about US $200 billion of the Chinese foreign exchange reserves (Fernandez 
2008:21). According to the CIC (2008a [1]) its investments are long term risk and profit 
oriented: “CICs overseas investment mainly includes equity, fixed income and alternative 
assets in developed countries and emerging economies. Alternative investments include 
private equity, hedge funds and real estate, etc” (CIC 2008a [1]). China launched its first SWF 
in the context of an appreciating currency, to make higher returns on a part of the Chinese 
foreign exchange reserves in order to balance some of the losses connected to the currency 
shifts.  
 
Thus the objectives of all three reserve banks – SAMA, HKMA, SAFE – differ to some extent 
from the tasks of Western central banks, since elements of return maximisation are 
incorporated into the framework of maintaining monetary stability and liquidity. But history 
reveals that such a constellation of serving the public purpose of maintaining monetary 
stability, but also focusing on profit maximisation, is nothing new. In fact, there have been 
many variants of central banks during the last three centuries (Collins 1993:x).  
 
According to the extensive research of Goodhart (1995: 205-7), the function and purpose of 
central banks have significantly changed over time. For instance, one of the earliest reserve 
banks, the Bank of England originally established as a Commercial Bank, had both profit 
motives, as well as public tasks such as maintaining the nation’s convertibility of all notes and 
deposits into gold. However, in the second half of the 19th century it became increasingly 
clear that the Bank of England’s public duty of maintaining the convertibility and supervision 
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of the national banking system contradicted its profit maximising motives (Goodhart 
2005:209). Bagehot (1892:163) describes this situation in Lombard Street: “For more than 
fifty years – from 1793 down to 1844 – there was a keen controversy as to the public duties of 
the Bank.” Finally, the Bank Charter Act 1844 terminated the conflict between profit interests 
and public duties by outsourcing the profit branch from the central banking operations 
(Bagehot 1892:163).  
 
In the light of this historical background the SAMA, the HKMA, and the SAFE have 
intersecting elements similar to central banks of the early 19th century. Therefore, these 
central banks should be characterized as ‘Hybrid Monetary Authorities’, since their tasks and 
objectives differ from those of modern Western central banks. Graphic 14 illustrates the 
overlapping elements shared by the ‘Hybrid Monetary Authority’ and the central bank of the 
early 19th century.  
 
 
Graphic 14. Intersecting Elements of Monetary Authorities 
 Return  Liquidity monetary stability 
Modern Central 
Banks 
 
 
Hybrid Monetary 
Authorities 
 
 
Central Banks of 
19th century 
 
 
 
 
Whereas the tasks of the modern central bank primarily cover aspects related to 
macroeconomic stability, such as liquidity and monetary stability, Hybrid Monetary Agencies 
also incorporate return objectives. The broad spectrum covered by Hybrid Monetary 
Authorities inevitably integrates a greater variety of interests and dynamics. As a 
consequence, the return maximising incentive might generate internal tensions with other 
objectives such as sustaining monetary stability. This conflict of diverse interests would 
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suggest an outsourcing of the return oriented branch in a similar fashion as the central banks 
of the 19th century. In fact, in 2007 China’s SAFE outsourced its return oriented branch into 
an SWF, the ‘Chinese Investment Corporation’. The second example for such a divestment is 
the SAMA which established an SWF in 2008, the ‘Public Investment Fund’ (The Economist 
2008d). 
 
Thus, an undifferentiated dumping together of state related capital pools, such as central 
banks, into the category of SWFs seems problematical in order to analyse the SWF 
phenomenon. That means mere intersections between the objectives of some ‘central banks’ 
and SWFs are not enough to warrant being described as an SWF. The position supported here 
is that the three mentioned financial institutions – SAFE, SAMA, HKMA – are not SWFs in 
the narrow sense, but rather Hybrid Monetary Authorities that incorporate both the tasks of a 
modern reserve bank, such as maintaining liquidity and stability, as well as return oriented 
elements similar to reserve banks in the early 19th century. However, the multiplicity of 
objectives generated by the broad spectrum covered by Hybrid Monetary Authorities has led 
to an outsourcing tendency of the return oriented branches into SWFs. The findings of this 
section resemble the problems of the next section, of how to differentiate between pension 
funds and SWFs. 
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 3.4.2 Pension Funds 
 
The time after the Second World War can be characterised as a period of a dramatic shift in 
demographics. Due to better medical supply and other social aspects related to economic 
development, more people are living longer. This has contributed to a doubling of the world 
population since the 1950s comprising in 2000 more than six billion people (US Census 
Bureau 2008: [1]). However, that growth has been accompanied by two tendencies: an overall 
rise in lifespan; and, a decrease in the fertility rate (Disney 1996:5,7). Both tendencies, 
initially experienced only in industrialised western countries and increasingly apparent in 
developing countries, contribute to an ageing society (UN DESA 2000:1; Disney 1996:1). 
Moreover, this demographic shift towards an ageing population has to be considered in the 
context of the weakening of traditional “intergenerational social support systems” (UN DESA 
2000:1; Disney 1996:17). The main features of traditional support systems, such as large 
families, as well as the role of women as family care takers, are increasingly challenged by 
economic development associated with urbanisation (UN DESA 2000:1). This is supported by 
Leibenstein (1977:354; 1981) who investigated changing patterns of marriage and fertility in 
the context of economic development. He noticed that families in developing countries have 
considerably more children than in developed countries. Therefore, Leibenstein (1977), and 
others such as Bateman et al. (2001:7), Disney (1996:17), and the World Bank (1994:56), link 
shrinking family size to aspects of economic development. 
 
However, the combination of both the impairment of traditional social support structures, 
most visibly represented in decreasing family sizes, and the changing role of women from 
family care takers to employees, and an overall ageing population, pose a variety of problems 
to policy makers. Hence, some policy has introduced ‘pay as you go’ pension schemes 
(Bateman et al. 2001:2), which are “plans that are financed directly from contributors…” 
(OECD 2005:51). That means the current pension entitlements are financed through the 
current working generation by transferring current tax receipts to the currently retired 
(Bateman et al. 2001:2; Disney 1996:18). The implementation of ‘pay as you go’ pension 
schemes already indicates a gradual replacing of the traditional intergenerational social 
support systems. However, in the light of rapid demographic change, where a smaller working 
age population has to support a growing retired population (World Bank 1994:92), the 
sustainability of ‘pay as you go’ schemes remains questionable (Bateman et al. 2001:3; 
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Disney 1996:18). Thus new means of support for an ageing population, able to complement or 
replace traditional or ‘pay as you go’ schemes, are essential for the long run. 
  
Pension funds represent such a means of support. The OECD (2005:16) refers to pension 
funds as “pool[s] of assets forming an independent legal entity that are bought with the 
contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension plan benefits.” 
There are two types of pension funds: public pension funds with a volume of estimated US 
$4.4 trillion in 2006/07 (Blundell 2008:117); and private pension funds comprising more than 
US $15 trillion in assets (see Graphic 12). Nevertheless, sometimes a clear cut differentiation 
between private and public pension funds is difficult, since both have intersecting elements 
(OECD 2005: 30). For example, in the case of public funds, management tasks are sometimes 
outsourced to private companies, whereas in the case of private funds, the government 
sometimes guarantees a minimum return (OECD 2005:31). Suffice it to say, public pension 
funds can be described as statutory programmes related to governments, while private pension 
funds are administered by private institutions under private law (OECD 2005:12).  
But both public and private pension funds are related to the state in the sense that their 
investments benefit from generous tax exemption.30 The following two sections concentrate 
on the comparison between pension funds, and SWFs in general. The first part analyses some 
of the similarities between pension funds and SWFs, while the second part outlines some of 
the differences between both, with particular reference to public pension funds. 
 
Some governments, such as the Irish or the New Zealand, initiated their SWFs on 
considerations of an ageing population. In order to continue sustainable consumption of 
resources over time for an increasing number of pensioners, they established an SWF 
(Superannuation Fund 2008; National Pension Fund Ireland 2008). In fact, most of the SWFs 
with the explicit purpose of providing pension liabilities for future generations have been 
formed since 200031. Nevertheless, Chapter 1 showed that the SWF phenomenon is much 
older, dating back to the 1950s where governments, most notably Kuwait, formed the first 
                                                 
30 In following countries Pension Fund earnings are tax exempt: Argentinia, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, South Korea, Mexico, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay (Bateman et 
al. 2001:140,141). 
 
31 Pension Reserve Fund (France) 2000 (Fernandez 2008:43) 
National Pension Fund (Ireland) est. 2001 (Fernandez 2008:52) 
Superannuation Fund (New Zealand) 2001 (Fernandez 2008:70) 
Norwegian Pension Fund Global est. 2005 (Fernandez 2008:24) 
Pension Reserve Fund (Chile) 2006 (Fernandez 2008:89) 
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SWFs. In exactly the same period General Motors initiated in 1952 the first modern pension 
fund (Drucker 1976:vii). Nevertheless, the emergence of both pension funds and SWFs in the 
same historical context is more a coincidence than a feature of similarity. 
 
The prominence of both actors has regularly been accompanied by tremendous growth 
expectations. According to Blackburn (2002: 11), one of the most exaggerated estimates 
concerning pension funds was made by Peter Drucker (1976) in his famous book The Pension 
Fund Revolution. Drucker (1976:1) estimated in the 1970s that pension funds were by 1995 
going to control about two thirds of all US Business. Consequently, because of that dimension 
he assumed that such dramatic structural economic impacts would change capitalism (Drucker 
1976: 33,34). Drucker proclaimed (1976:1,4) a ‘pension fund revolution’ which would 
transfer the fruits of the production process back to the source of the wealth, namely to the 
workers. According to Drucker (1976:4) this would change the structure of capitalism 
allowing countries such as the US to take the final step towards genuine socialism.  
 
In fact, by the mid-1990s pension funds already owned approximately 25 per cent of the 
equities (Clark 1998: 150). However, it hardly can be said that as a result of this, the US was 
transformed into a socialist country.  
 
In the same fashion, the SWF debate in 2007 was accompanied by high growth expectations. 
For instance, Stephen Jen (2007:1) the managing director and chief currency economist at 
Morgan Stanley estimated the SWF asset volume would increase to approximately US $12 
trillion by 2012. Another evaluation, from Gerard Lyons (2007:1) chief economist at Standard 
Chartered saw SWFs in the next decade growing to an amount of US $13.4 trillion. These 
estimates from acknowledged economists and commentators have contributed to a debate 
similar to the pension fund debate in the 1970s: whether SWFs would change the hitherto 
capitalist system. Quality papers, most notably The Economist (2008b), as well as financial 
experts, such as Lyons (2007:2), proclaimed “The Rise of State Capitalism” in the context of 
a dramatic growth of SWFs. The proponents of the idea that SWFs would impact on the 
nature of Western liberal capitalism can be divided into two categories: one faction that 
stresses the qualitative dimension, and the other that accentuates the quantitative dimension of 
such a change. The proponents of the quantitative dimension, such as Truman (2008:3) Setser 
(2008:2), and Lyon (2007:2) emphasize the shift of economic power from the ‘West to the 
Rest’, or in other words a redistribution of wealth from industrialised countries – like the US – 
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to emerging markets, such as China, since most of the new wealth is created in non-Western 
countries. In contrast, another faction also comprising economists, most notably Summers 
(2008), stress the qualitative impact of SWFs on the nature of capitalism. Although Summers 
(2008) emphasises this point more explicitly, Truman (2008:3, 5) would also agree that there 
is, to some extent, a redistribution from private to public wealth. Hence, the focus of the 
qualitative faction is less on wealth shifts among states, but rather on a redistribution of 
wealth taking place within the state from the private to the state sector. Former chief 
economist of the World Bank, Summers (2008:[1]), highlights that “governments are now 
accumulating various kinds of stakes in what were once purely private companies”. However, 
it is highly speculative to predict a substantial change in the patterns of western liberal 
capitalism, since that would depend on many variables, such as the actual growth of SWFs 
and their behaviour. Actually, the prognosis of Drucker (1976) should serve as an example for 
being careful with such predictions about SWFs. If the discussion up to this point has 
emphasized historical parallels between pension funds and SWFs, the following paragraph 
should also devote some time to other semblances, in particular tax issues. 
 
In both cases, the bulk of pension fund and SWF assets is concentrated in a small number of 
funds. In one of the first articles about SWFs Rozanov (2005:1) notes the similarity in size 
and scope between some SWFs and pension funds. For instance, the largest 300 pension funds 
together comprise a volume of US $10.4 trillion (Watson Wyatt 2006:4). Out of this number 
each of the twenty largest pension funds has an average size of US $171.4 billion (calculated 
with data from Watson Wyatt 2006:14). Again, from these top twenty, the Government 
Pension Fund of Japan constitutes the biggest pension fund, with a volume of US $935.6 
billion. Similar to that, the largest SWF, the Abu Dhabi Investment Corporation, holds assets 
worth approximately US $800 billion (Watson Wyatt 2006:22). In the same fashion, the 
largest part of SWF assets is concentrated in a small number of funds: as Fernandez (2008:8) 
notes “the top ten funds account for about 80% of all SWF assets”. But which factors are 
responsible for that enormous size? The following paragraph suggests that capacious tax 
privileges play a central role. 
  
Both pension funds and SWFs, particularly saving funds and stabilisation funds, can be 
described as investors and not owners, since they are more interested in return maximisation 
than control (Drucker 1976:82; see also Chapter 3.3.2.). It must be remembered, that only 
portfolio investment has tax privileges in some countries, in particular the US, the UK, and 
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Australia (Joint Committee on Taxation 2008:74,77). Much of the literature takes the position 
that tax privileges have been essential for the rapid growth of pension funds (Davis 1995:77; 
World Bank 1994:9). Scholars such as Blackburn (2002:108) go even further, claiming that 
pension funds are products of tax policies. As a matter of fact, in 1998 pension funds had 
fiscal exemptions worth Pounds 17.5 billion in the UK, and pension funds in the US were 
exempted from taxes worth about US $109 billion in 2000 (Blackburn 2002:107). Through 
taxation a state can substantially influence the economic behaviour of actors since “taxation 
diverts economic activity from taxed to untaxed areas or from areas with higher taxes to areas 
of lower taxes” (Bateman et al. 2001:135). This suggests that comprehensive tax privileges 
play an important role in the operations of pension funds. 
 
The same might be true for SWFs. However, the debate of to what extent tax issues influence 
the decisions of SWFs is more controversial. While there are those, such as Fleischer 
(2008:28), who characterize tax exemptions for SWFs as subsidising foreign governments and 
crowding out private business, others, most notably the US Joint Committee on Taxation 
(2008:65), take the position that the real benefit of tax exemption for SWFs is unclear since 
private foreign investors have most of the benefits enjoyed by SWFs. But both would agree 
that Anglo Saxon countries – such as the US, the UK, and Australia – treat portfolio 
investment made by SWFs favourably in terms of tax (Joint Committee on Taxation 2008:77; 
Fleischer 2008:18). That means income from portfolio investment, in other words assets 
where SWFs control only 10 per cent or less, is tax exempted (Joint Committee on Taxation 
2008:77; Fleischer 2008:18). These findings suggest that SWFs which make portfolio 
investments have a comparative advantage over private firms, as their dividend yield is tax 
free (Fleischer 2008:28). According to Fleischer (2008:28) the “average dividend yield of 
S&P 500 stocks, as of mid-2008, was only 2.1%”, whereas the profits attained by SWFs were 
substantially higher32.  
                                                 
32  
SWF investments in the US of over US $1 billion (as of March 2008) 
Target Buyer Amount Dividend Yielded 
Citigroup ADIA (United Emirates) 7.5 billion 5.32% 
Citigroup GIC (Singapore) 6.88 billion 5.32% 
Citigroup KIA (Kuwait) 3 billion 5.32% 
Merrill Lynch Temasek (Singapore) 4.4 billion 3.03% 
Merrill Lynch KIA (Kuwait 2 billion 3.03% 
Morgan Stanley CIC (China) 5 billion 2.27% 
Blackstone CIC (China) 3 billion 6.44% 
Och-Ziff Dubai International 1.26 billion 
 
23.99% 
Source: Fleischer 2008:29. 
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 However, due to lack of transparency it is highly speculative to argue that tax exemptions 
explain the investments of SWFs. It may be one of many other factors influencing the 
decisions of SWFs investing in countries such as the US. But it can be said that Anglo Saxon 
countries prefer portfolio rather than direct investments since direct investments have no tax 
privileges. Having discussed some of the similarities among pension funds and SWFs the 
following section emphasizes those aspects which legitimise a differentiation between both 
pension funds and SWFs. 
 
The previous section has shown that pension funds and several SWFs, in particular some 
saving funds, have certain overlapping characteristics. However, that can lead to confusion as 
to whether it is better to describe some funds, such as the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund, as pension fund or SWF. Hence, this section establishes a coherent justification for why 
pension funds and SWFs should be treated as separate entities. Although pension funds and 
SWFs33 are portfolio investors connected to governments in that sense that both have special 
tax privileges, there remain some crucial differences.  
 
Firstly, the funding structures of SWFs differ sharply from pension funds. While pension 
funds are mainly funded by sources which are extracted from the domestic population through 
tax and compulsory or voluntary contributions (Blundell 2008:4), SWFs are financed in most 
cases by external revenues, comprising revenues from resource extraction – such as oil, gas, 
copper, and diamonds – or a current account surplus generated by export activities (Blundell 
2008:2; Fernandez 2008; Truman 2008). Fiscal measures too, in particular tax (Blundell 
2008:2) or asset transfers – for instance from currency stock reserves into a SWF as was the 
case in China (Monk 2008:4) – can also be used to establish or fund an SWF. Hence, the 
nature of funding substantially differs between SWFs and pension funds. Whereas SWFs are 
funded in most cases by income received from external resources, pension funds extract their 
sources from the domestic population.  
 
Secondly there are dissimilarities related to the patterns of capital allocation, or in other words 
where pension funds and SWFs invest their assets: domestically or internationally. Although 
both have in common that they are portfolio investors34 they allocate their portfolio 
investments in geographically different areas. Unlike pension funds which denominate most 
                                                 
33 Except investment holding companies. 
34 Except investment holding companies. 
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of their assets in local currency with low exposure to foreign assets, SWFs hold the bulk of 
their investments in foreign countries and currencies (Kimmitt 2008:120). According to Davis 
(1995:206), pension funds invest at least 60-90 per cent of their capital in home markets. In 
contrast, SWFs, even investment holding companies (see Chapter 3.3.1), hold most of their 
assets in international markets.  
 
However, having characterised both pension funds as well as SWFs, such as saving funds and 
stabilisation funds, as portfolio investors, this should result in similar investment behaviour. 
According to the assumption that portfolio investment seeks the highest return, both actors – 
pension funds and SWFs – should invest in similar markets where they both can yield the 
highest return. In contrast, the findings of this section suggest a substantial disparity in 
patterns of their asset allocation. But what causes such a difference in the allocation of 
investments? It seems that aspects related to political issues are crucial factors. In many cases 
pension funds, in particular public pension funds, “are required to invest in public securities, 
yielding low or even negative returns…” (World Bank 1994:14). For instance the 
Singaporean state owned Central Provident Fund invested 90 per cent of its money in public 
bonds with a low nominal rate of return of  three per cent during the 1990s (Blackburn 2002: 
263). Other countries, such as Denmark influence the behaviour of their pension funds by 
introducing minimum requirements which have to be invested in domestic or Euro-
denominated debts (Bateman et al. 2001:67). Some countries even go further by prohibiting 
their pension funds to invest in foreign countries, as was the case in Chile until the 1990s 
(World Bank 1994: 222). Both actors are influenced by politics to different degrees. 
 
Although, pension funds invest the bulk of their money in domestic assets, scholars such as 
Davis (1995:203) note that since the 1980s pension funds increasingly invest a part of their 
capital into foreign markets. Blackburn (2002:238) supports that observation by stating that 
UK’s pension funds already invest more than 30 per cent of their capital abroad. Foreign 
investments of pension funds incorporate both: a diversification of country risk but also 
capital flight accompanied by a loss of control by monetary authorities (Davis 1995). These 
findings suggest that both SWFs and pension funds differ substantially in aspects funding and 
the allocation of these funds. 
 
This section has illustrated that SWFs and pension funds have some aspects in common. Both 
actors are characterised by a high asset concentration in a small number of funds. Like 
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pension funds, some of the SWFs, such as saving funds and stabilisation funds, are explicit 
portfolio investors. These passive investments made by both pension funds and SWFs have 
generous tax privileges from states in which they invest. However, although having 
emphasised some of the similarities, this section takes the position that pension funds differ 
substantially from SWFs in structural matters of how they are funded and of how they invest 
their funds. While SWFs are financed by external income, derived in most cases from export 
surpluses, pension funds are funded by income derived from the domestic population, through 
taxes, and compulsory or voluntary contributions. That relates to the second differing 
structural feature among SWFs and pension funds, namely the question of where they invest 
that income. While SWFs tend to reinvest their externally received income into international 
markets, pension funds are inclined to hold the largest part of their assets in domestic 
investments. 
 
The rapid growth of SWFs and their assets in last decade has not been accompanied by an 
adequate political economic analysis of this phenomenon. There have only been a few 
economic attempts to systematically analyse SWFs. However, in the light of an inflationary 
and often undifferentiated use of the word SWFs, in particular since 2007, there is a pressing 
need to establish an empirical framework that deals with some of the neglected ambiguities. 
Those ambiguities appear most visible in a tendency of dumping together different actors into 
the category of SWF in various SWF ratings for instance. That often creates disorientation as 
to whether it is adequate to describe a certain actor as an SWF.  
 
This chapter has shown that SWFs are such a multifaceted phenomenon that a universal 
definition can not easily encapsulate that complexity. On the one hand, a too broadly 
formulated definition of SWFs automatically embraces other financial actors which share 
some similarities; on the other hand, a too narrowly formulated definition entails the problem 
of ignoring substantial aspects that are important for the understanding of SWFs. Therefore, 
the taxonomy in this Chapter (see Figure 7) embraces both an inclusive dimension which 
embraces all state related pools of capital in order to get a comprehensive picture of all forms 
of sovereign wealth, and a descriptive dimension on the vertical level which depicts different 
core characteristics of these actors. Hence, the central characteristics of related actors are 
covered. 
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By doing this the grey zones which sometimes lead to confusion, whether to describe one 
actor as SWF or not, have been included. An understanding and differentiation of the 
dynamics of these ‘state related pools of capital’ establishes a firmer basis on which to 
understand the phenomenon of SWFs. For instance, it has been shown that Monetary 
Authorities – in particular the SAMA, HKMA or SAFE – should not be characterised as 
SWFs, but rather as Hybrid Monetary Authorities incorporating both the tasks of modern 
central banks, as well as the objectives of return maximisation. The identification of these 
intersections and overlapping is essential for a finer differentiation between different actors 
related to sovereign wealth. A better understanding of the phenomenon SWFs also has wider 
implications on the implementation of policies related to SWFs. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter 3 has shown the existence of a core relationship prevalent in all three 
types of SWFs: saving funds, stabilisation funds, and investment holding companies. While 
direct investments of SWFs are concentrated domestically, portfolio investments made by 
SWFs prefer international markets. Investment holding companies, for example, hold a 
substantial part of their direct investments in domestic assets, while their portfolio 
investments are concentrated in international assets. This is also true for the other types of 
SWFs, such as saving funds and stabilisation funds, which invest their capital in form of 
portfolio investment in international rather than domestic markets. Hence the investment type 
– whether direct or portfolio investment – is related to the investment allocation. However, 
this correlation might be less a natural phenomenon, than an outcome of a complex political 
context. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Despite the turmoil in international finance in 2008, where global investors – among them 
also Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) – suffered from heavy capital losses, a substantial part 
of money remains concentrated in SWFs. Hence, these state related financial power brokers, 
are here to stay and they likely to increase their influence in finance in the coming decade, in 
a shaping role in international finance. This thesis has examined the reasons why SWFs 
should be differentiated from other actors in international finance and why SWFs will remain 
important, and was structured into three Chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 put SWFs in an historical political context. It was argued that SWFs are not a new 
phenomenon, but rather evolved from the 1950s. Politics, in other words, heavy state 
intervention, has enabled the economic foundation for many SWFs. By partly renationalising 
oil industries or unilaterally increasing oil taxes on private foreign oil companies, states made 
a claim on resources for national purposes. Chapter 1 demonstrated that the first economic 
steps of SWFs cannot be separated from the political context of that time. 
 
Given the background in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examined the current political economic 
environment of SWFs. It illustrated the heterogeneity of states, on the one hand, and the 
heterogeneity of SWFs, on the other hand. The title of Chapter 2, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
among Other Sovereign Wealth Funds, implies that each SWF is related to a particular state. 
Although the international order is becoming more complex, the fundamental structures of 
world politics continue to revolve around the actor state. The most significant variables to 
describe or characterise a state refer to geographical, economic, and governmental aspects. 
These facets appear regularly in the SWF debate. Therefore Chapter 2 integrated these state 
related aspects. The categorisation of various states into OECD and non-OECD countries 
captured these three dimensions, and thereby reduced complexity. In addition, the dichotomy 
of ‘commodity financed SWFs’ versus ‘non-commodity financed SWFs’ was introduced to 
reveal complexities related to SWFs.  
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Both of these categorisations were subsequently integrated into a chronological framework in 
order to systemise the formation phases of SWFs between OECD and non-OECD countries 
(Figures 4. and 6.).  
 
Chapter 3 analysed the relationship between SWFs and other financial actors, and emphasised 
some of the similarities between SWFs and other financial actors, such as central banks or 
pension funds. This established an empirical foundation to differentiate between three main 
types of SWFs – Investment Holding Companies, Saving Funds, and Stabilisation Funds – 
along structural dimensions. 
  
It was found that circumstances relevant to the economic foundations of many SWFs are 
heavy influenced by politics. For instance the economic basis of the first SWF – the Kuwait 
Investment Authority – was a result of state intervention in terms of unilaterally increasing oil 
tax, and partly renationalising natural resources. Also demonstrated was that in the case of 
commodity financed SWFs, there is not much difference in the formation process of SWFs 
between OECD and non-OECD countries. In particular during earlier phases of high 
commodity prices, in particular oil both OECD and non-OECD countries established SWFs in 
order to recycle a part of the commodity surplus revenues. However, the situation shifted 
dramatically in the years after 2000, where SWFs of non-OECD countries have become the 
dominant players. In the case of non-commodity financed SWFs, it is more difficult to 
determine similar patterns of behaviour, since the funding resources are much more 
heterogeneous. But it was found that governments with large foreign exchange reserves, in 
particular China and Singapore, tend to establish SWFs in order to receive higher returns. Not 
less important in terms of volume are SWFs which are financed through fiscal policies. 
 
The relevance of a differentiation among SWFs – based on empirical data – is supported. The 
group of funds categorized as SWFs can be further separated into investment holding 
companies, saving funds, and stabilisation funds. Each of these subcategories has distinctive 
characteristics. Despite these distinctions there is an overall relationship among those funds 
between the variable ‘asset allocation’ and ‘investment type’. Direct investments made by 
SWFs tend to be domestic, whereas portfolio investment tends to be international. Secondly, 
   78
 
it is clear that the relationship between SWFs and other financial actors, most notably central 
banks and pension funds is often misinterpreted. 
 
Only investigating the economic dimension of SWFs is similar to someone only looking at 
one side of a coin. Other aspects, particularly political and historical facets, have to be 
integrated in an analysis of SWFs to get a more comprehensive picture about this complex 
phenomenon. For this reason, categorisations of SWFs based on mere assumptions – without 
empirical foundation – covers more than it reveals. 
 
Therefore, knowing the position of SWFs in financial markets is critical in evaluating the 
effects that they may have on various dynamics related to financial markets. Firstly, 
acknowledging the different types of SWFs within the financial markets is necessary to 
evaluate how changes in the field of sovereign wealth investment affect financial markets. 
Secondly, knowing the position of related financial actors is necessary to evaluate the impacts 
and dimensions of SWFs. Consequently, an implication for governments concerned with 
SWFs is a more differentiated policy approach towards these financial actors. Furthermore, 
this information can also be used by the private sector to develop a better understanding of 
SWFs. 
 
Pure economic approaches struggle with the obvious intersection of states and funds in an 
international financial environment. To analyse the behaviour and impacts of this growing 
pool of state related financial capital more comprehensive approaches have to be applied. 
Therefore, an analysis through an International Political Economy (IPE) perspective has 
significant advantages. IPE investigates intersections between politics and economics on a 
broader and more comprehensive level than economics. Furthermore, IPE comprises elements 
of various disciplines, most notably International Relations, Political Science, Sociology, and 
Economics, which can contribute in a fruitful way to further research on this topic. The main 
objective of this empirical survey was to develop a framework that positions the state related 
financial actor SWF into an IPE context. These research findings can be used as a stepping 
stone for further analysis. Further work needs to be done to establish whether the role of 
central banks is changing towards more focus on aspects related to return, as suggested by 
Rozanov (2005). It would also be interesting to assess the effects of SWFs on other financial 
actors, in particular private equity or hedge funds, especially after the financial crisis in 2008. 
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Appendix A. Capital Injections made by SWFs in 2007 
 
Date  Bank SWF Amount in 
billion US $ 
Nov. 26, 2007 Citigroup Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority 
(ADIA) 
7.5  
Dec. 10, 2007 UBS Singapore (GIC) 9.7 
Dec. 19, 2007 Morgan Stanley China Investment 
Corporation (CIC) 
5 
Dec. 24, 2007 Merrill Lynch Singapore (Temasek) 4.4 
Jan. 15, 2008 Citigroup Singapore (GIC), 
Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA) 
6.8 (GIC) 
3 (KIA) 
Jan. 15, 2008 Merrill Lynch Korea Investment 
Corporation (KIC), 
KIA 
2 (KIC) 
2 (KIA) 
 
Feb. 18, 2008 Credit Suisse Quatar Investment 
Authority (QIA) 
0.5 
Apr. 16, 2008 Merrill Lynch Singapore (Temasek) 0.6 
Total                                                                                                            41,5 US $ billion  
in percent of total bank capital raised since Nov. 2007                          71%           
                                                                                                                                      
Source: Srinivasan 2008: 24. 
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Appendix B, Global Oil Price 
 
Source: zFacts 2008. 
 
 
 
Appendix C, The Chinese Yuan against the Dollar 
 
Source: The Economist 2008e. 
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Abstract            
 
 
This thesis is a comprehensive empirical survey which investigates the phenomenon  of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in an International Political Economy context. SWFs 
can be defined as state related pools of capital which derive most of their capital from 
external resources, and reinvest a large part of this capital internationally. These 
powerful financial brokers impact international finance in a number of ways. Due to 
their sheer size, SWFs influence global financial stability. Even if the financial crisis 
2008 has substantially reduced their volume, SWFs will continue to have immense 
financial influence.  
 
SWFs constitute a heterogenous group of actors, but there are distinct intersections 
between them and other financial players, such as central banks and pension funds. 
Despite these overlappings, SWFs can be clearly operationally differentiated into 
subcategories, and furthermore, can be clearly differentiated from other financial 
actors.  
 
Hence, knowing the position of SWFs in financial markets is critical in evaluating the 
effects that they may have on various dynamics related to financial markets. Pure 
economic approaches struggle with the obvious intersection of states and funds in an 
international financial environment. Therefore, an analysis through an International 
Political Economy perspective has significant advantages. 
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 Zusammenfassung 
 
 
 
 
Diese Arbeit ist ein umfassender empirischer Überblick, der Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(SWFs) in einem politisch- ökonomischen Kontext untersucht. Als SWFs bezeichnet 
man staatliche Investmentfonds oder Agenturen, die nationale Überschüsse 
organisatorisch getrennt von traditionellen Währungsreservenverwaltung verwalten. 
Diese Devisenreserven die sich ausschließlich aus Exporteinkünften speisen, werden 
mehrheitlich in internationale Märkte investiert. SWFs gehören mittlerweile neben 
Pensionsfonds zu den größten Akteuren am globalen Finanzmarkt. Durch ihr 
beachtliches Kapitalvolumen von mehreren Billionen US Dollar beeinflussen SWFs die 
Stabilität im internationalen Finanzgeschehen. Trotz der Finanzkrise 2008, die das 
Volumen einiger SWFs deutlich reduziert hat, werden SWFs weiterhin am Finanzmarkt 
eine leitende Rolle spielen.  
 
Unter SWFs versteht man  einen Sammelbegriff für eine heterogene Gruppe von 
Akteuren.  Es gibt nicht nur Ähnlichkeiten zwischen SWFs untereinander, sondern auch 
Überschneidungen mit verwandten Akteuren wie beispielsweise Zentralbanken oder 
Pensionsfonds. Trotz dieser Gemeinsamkeiten sollte man SWFs gegenüber anderen 
Akteuren besser ausdifferenzieren.  
 
Daher ist eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Einordnung entscheidend um etwaige 
Auswirkungen, die SWFs auf internationale Finanzmärkte haben, abschätzen zu 
können. Aus diesem Grunde ist es angebracht das Phänomen SWF aus einer 
international politik-ökonomischen Perspektive zu betrachten, da rein ökonomische 
Annäherungen politische Gesichtspunkte nicht  ausreichend mit einbeziehen.  
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